

JPRS-UMA-86-046

15 AUGUST 1986

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 2, FEBRUARY 1986

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15 AUGUST 1986

USSR REPORT  
MILITARY AFFAIRS

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 2, Feb 1986

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

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## NORTHERN FLEET OPERATIONS TO DEFEND SEALANES IN WAR YEARS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 24 Jan 86) pp 10-15

[Article by Adm P. N. Navoytsev published under the rubric "Soviet Military Art"; in 1941-1944 the author of the article, in command of the artillery control group and the commander of an antiaircraft battery on the Red Banner destroyer "Groznyy" from a Northern Fleet squadron, took direct part in the escorting of Allied convoys in the Barents Sea]

[Text] During the years of the Great Patriotic War the sealane running across the Arctic was considered the shortest and most convenient. Cargo from the United States and Great Britain reached the Soviet Union over it.(1) Shipments were carried out by Allied and Soviet transports which, as a rule, moved as part of convoys from the English and Icelandic ports to Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and back.

Upon the decision of Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC], the Northern Fleet was to escort the Allied convoys in its operational zone (to the east of the meridian of 20° E. long. in the Barents Sea). The thousand-mile leg of the journey made by the convoys here was the most dangerous, as they had to come close to the Norwegian coast (150-200 miles in the winter and spring and 350-400 in the summer and autumn) where the main enemy naval and air forces were based. In order to ensure safe travel of the vessels, not only many formations and units of the Northern Fleet had to be involved in convoy service but also the newly established White Sea Naval Flotilla.

Convoy operations were organized and conducted for escorting the vessels and transports. Before the convoy left the English or Icelandic ports, naval aviation reconnoitered the ice edge, the condition of the sealanes and channels and collected data on enemy movements at sea and on the coast. The meteorological service followed the weather forecast, particularly the changes in the direction of the prevailing winds.

While the convoy was at sea, systematic combat activities of the fleet (reconnaissance, the patrol service, minesweeping, antisubmarine, air and antimine defenses in the theater and other measures) were directed primarily at ensuring its security. Some 2 or 3 days before the transports and security forces approached the meridian of 20° E. long., submarines were deployed in

the base areas of enemy ships and on the most probable routes to the convoy. As a rule, five or six submarines headed to the designated areas with the mission of detecting the setting to sea of enemy surface forces and launching a torpedo attack against them.

Some 250-300 miles from the main base of the Northern Fleet, the convoy was met by two-four Soviet destroyers. Upon instructions of the convoy escort commander, they took up places in the formation in the aim of direct antisub, air, antimine and antiboat defense of the transports. Simultaneously air operations over the theater were intensified. Reconnaissance aviation conducted unflagging surveillance of the enemy airfields, ports and bases as well as enemy ships in the Barents Sea and searched for submarines and floating mines in the vast region of the sea to the north of the Kola Peninsula and in the mouth of the White Sea. During this period, bomber aviation attacked the enemy airfields of Banak, Hjelbukt and Luostari. With the appearance of the convoy in the fleet area (the region of Medvezhiy [Bear] Island), air strikes against the airfields were intensified. On individual days these were launched continuously around the clock by groups or individual aircraft. With the approach of the convoy to Kola Bay or the mouth of the White Sea at a distance of 200 miles, groups of our fighters made frequent flights to this area. When the aircraft were based not farther than 60-70 miles from the convoy, there was constant air patrolling by a group of fighters in the aim of providing an air cover for the transports and escort vessels.

As the convoy approached the shores (approximately 200 miles), along the course search was conducted for German submarines using the PE-3 aircraft. At a distance of 80-120 miles from the coast, a strengthened detachment of MBR-2 seaplanes and patrol boats joined the search and on the approaches to the ports subchasers were included. Minesweepers swept for mines on the courses followed by the convoy and on the approach channels to Kola Bay and the mouth of the White Sea.

With the approach of the convoy to Kola Bay or in moving along the Kola Peninsula to Arkhangelsk as well as at the moment of entering the ports, aircraft at the airfields, ships at base as well as the shore and antiaircraft batteries were brought to a higher state of combat readiness. Ready to immediately set to sea was a detachment of fighting ships specially assigned for locating and escorting the vessels which for some reason had strayed away from the convoy. Rescue and salvage ships were also fully ready to provide aid for damaged ships and vessels. Safe navigation for the ships and vessels in approaching the shores and ports were provided by radio beacons, sending points, line-up fires and other navigation and hydrographic facilities. When it was necessary to escort individual groups of transports and single vessels, hydrographic vessels were sent out equipped with the necessary navigation instruments. A Soviet pilot was provided for each convoy ship and transport.

During the unloading and loading of the transports, air defense for them was provided by the air defense weapons of the main base of the fleet and the White Sea Flotilla, as well as the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk air defense divisional areas of the nation's territory.

Some 2-4 days after the arrival of the convoy in our ports, as a rule, a caravan of vessels was organized for moving back to the ports of England and Iceland. The ships took it under their protection and the finally organized convoy headed out on the return trip. Security for this convoy was organized and carried out following the same scheme as in meeting the convoy traveling to the Soviet ports.

An example of the effective operations of the Northern Fleet forces to defend the overseas sealanes can be seen from the escorting of the Allied convoy PQ-18 consisting of 40 transports at the beginning of September 1942. The English side also undertook corresponding measures for the safety of the convoy. Aside from a direct escort, the convoy had a strong close cover: a cruiser and 16 destroyers. An aircraft carrier was employed for the first time. Submarines were deployed for covering the convoy against enemy surface ships along the Norwegian coast. Regardless of this impressive cover and escort, its reliability was not sufficiently high. The enemy succeeded in sinking 13 transports in the zone covered by our Allies,(2) while in the zone of the Northern Fleet only 1 transport was sunk.(3) As previously, virtually all the ships were assigned by our side to ensure the convoy's security. Our aviation, in launching systematic attacks against enemy airfields from which the enemy could threaten the convoy, destroyed around 20 aircraft. During this time, our aviation made 775 aircraft sorties, including 274 for the fighter cover of the ships and vessels and 102 for reconnaissance and searching for enemy submarines.(4)

Each operation was led by the fleet commander through his staff, the commanders and staffs of the formations. He also coordinated the ships and fleet units with the Allied naval forces in the operational zone of the Northern Fleet. Particular attention was given to this question since the fate of one or another convoy often depended upon its solution. The organization of joint operations with the command of the English and American navies was carried out by the leadership of the Northern Fleet through the Allied naval missions located in Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Polyarnoye. The English missions (there were two of them) and the staffs of the Northern Fleet and White Sea Flotilla were basically concerned with the questions of the joint defense of the external sealanes in the operational zone of our fleet. Their competence also included: the organizing of the convoys from the Soviet Union back to England, the unloading and loading of the vessels, the basing of a limited number of English ships and airplanes at locations in the Soviet Arctic and these participated in the defense of the convoys in our waters in 1941-1942. The American mission supplied its ships with everything necessary during their anchorage at the ports of the White Sea and Kola Bay.

In the course of the joint defense of the convoys, a definite order was established in exchanging essential information for planning and carrying out various measures. Thus, information obtained by our aviation in conducting preliminary ice reconnaissance was sent via the English military missions to the Admiralty. There, using them, they plotted the courses of the convoys preparing to leave the English and Icelandic ports. In turn, from the English military mission in Polyarnoye, the Northern Fleet Command received information on the composition of one or another expected convoy, on the organization of its command and control, the courses and the assumed time for entering the



operational zone of the fleet. Proceeding from these data as well as information on the enemy, the Northern Fleet Staff upon instructions of the commander began to plan and prepare the convoy operation. Questions to the British Admiralty on supporting the convoys leaving from England or Iceland were cleared up by the fleet command through the Navy High Staff. Other clarifications concerning the meeting of the vessels and transports in our ports or their dispatch were made on the spot after seeking approval of the English naval mission.

The start to actual cooperation to the Northern Fleet with English naval forces in ensuring the safety of the sealanes was made during the first days of August 1941 in escorting the crossing of the minelayer "Adventure" with a cargo of depth charges and magnetic mines to Arkhangelsk. For this purpose, a special plan was worked out for supporting and covering the move of the "Adventure" and its unloading at port. In the move from Cape Dolshoy Gorodetskiy to Arkhangelsk, the minelayer was escorted by the destroyer "Sokrushitelnyy." It also escorted the English ship on the way back from Arkhangelsk to the parallel of Cape Kanin Nos. At this same time, another destroyer "Groznyy" was searching for enemy submarines in the White Sea to the north of the parallel of 66° 30'. In accord with the plan for covering the minelayer in its move, air reconnaissance was carried out by planes from the 49th Air Squadron. The effective naval operations combined with the measures carried out by the Allied navies made it possible to escort many ships and transports along the northern sealanes. Thus, in 1941, 51 transports (including 9 Soviet) arrived in the USSR as part of 7 overseas convoys. Four convoys (47 vessels, including 15 Soviet) left our ports to the West. Some 160,413 tons of cargo were delivered and 145,758 tons dispatched. In the aim of ensuring the security of the convoys, the ships of the Northern Fleet made, respectively, 58 and 34 trips to sea.(5) In 1942, 814,654 tons of cargo were delivered to the northern Soviet ports. Some 366,023 tons were dispatched abroad. For covering the arriving and return convoys, respectively 191 and 126 trips to sea were made, respectively, by the ships of the Northern Fleet.(6)

With the increased intensity of shipping along our northern sealanes, the enemy was forced to pay more attention to them. At the start of 1942, having concentrated its main naval forces at bases in Northern Norway, it increased operations on these sealanes. On the routes from the shores of England and Iceland, the Allied convoys right until their entry into Kola Bay and the White Sea began to come under continuous attacks by enemy aircraft, submarines and surface vessels with the main operational regions being the approaches to Medvezhiy Island and the Soviet ports.

Retaliatory measures were taken to protect the convoys. Thus, destroyers began to be systematically incorporated as part of the convoys. Particularly effective was the use of new destroyers armed with increased fire power artillery systems. For repelling attacks by low-flying enemy torpedo planes, they fired time-fuzed, high-explosive shells from 130-mm guns. This forced the enemy aircraft to swerve from the launch run and drop the torpedoes past the target. During the passage of one or another convoy, the Northern Fleet submarines operating off the coast of Norway in March-April alone redeployed four times to take up new stations. A major role was assigned to aviation,



particularly in searching for and neutralizing enemy submarines. Due to the fact that the Northern Fleet did not have aircraft specially designed for combating subs, reconnaissance aviation was widely used for these purposes.

Regardless of the measures undertaken by the Soviet Union, the seaway, starting from the meridian of Nordkapp and further to the east, remained unsafe. In 1942, the convoys suffered the most significant losses. A large portion of the losses caused by the inefficiency of the English Admiralty happened in convoy PQ-17. The English were first endeavoring to destroy the battleship "Tirpitz" considering the task of supporting convoy PQ-17 as secondary. Under these conditions, the operation of escorting the convoy was to be turned into setting a trap for the "Tirpitz" with a lure consisting of over 30 heavily loaded vessels. The major disaster of escorting convoy PQ-17 (on the 24 vessels sunk with a total tonnage of around 143,000 tons, 3,350 motor vehicles, 430 tanks, 210 aircraft and around 100,000 tons of other cargo were lost)(7) served as grounds for the English to delay the dispatch of regular convoys to the USSR. In the arising situation, upon the proposal of the Soviet Command, trips were organized for individual transports armed with machine gun and artillery weapons and depth charges. The necessary measures were also undertaken in the aim of protecting them as well as escorting small convoys. Thus, at the end of August 1942, the security for the Allied ships (the light cruiser "Tuscaloosa," three destroyers carrying military cargo as well as two other English destroyers which had left from Arkhangelsk to meet them) was provided by the destroyers "Gremyashchiy" and "Sokrushitelnyy" under the cover of Northern Fleet fighters. The ASW missions were carried out by boats (small subchasers) and MBR-2 aircraft.

The arrival of new ships and aircraft in 1943 for the Northern Fleet made it possible to it to more actively defend the sealanes, including the overseas ones. Air reconnaissance of the German submarines was conducted systematically, and the areas of this were widened to Medvezhiy Island and Altenfjord. During the year, the air forces of the fleet made the following aircraft sorties: 183 for reconnaissance; 98 for ASW security; 583 for providing a cover for convoys and individual ships; 301 for attacking airfields. The surface vessels made 155 trips to sea in the interests of supporting the convoys.(8)

In 1944, there was a noticeable rise in the activity of enemy submarines operating on our sealanes. Many of them by that time had been equipped with a device making it possible for the submarines to steam while submerged (the "snorkel") and they had more advanced radar and sonar equipment and acoustic torpedoes. Changes also occurred in their tactics. The submarine stations began to be chosen closer to our ports, at the exits from the bases, particularly in the area of Kola Bay and the mouth of the White Sea. For eliminating the threat from the active German submarines, the Northern Fleet Command increased the number of ships for direct escort of the convoys, for standing patrol duty and searching for the enemy in the areas of Kola Bay and the White Sea. The measures undertaken by the Northern Fleet Command to ensure the safety of the convoys made it possible in 1944-1945 to localize the operations of the enemy forces and virtually avoid losses in transports.

Thus, the defense of the overseas sealanes was one of the important missions of the Northern Fleet. Regardless of the shortage of forces, the fleet command worked out an effective system for escorting the ships and transports. Special operations were carried out to ensure their safety, and during these the most diverse forms were employed for utilizing the different forces under the conditions of the actual situation. These operations were characterized by the employment of navigation, hydrographic, radar and other equipment for surveillance, detection and warning in the aims of protecting the convoys.

Regardless of the shortage of specially built ASW ships and the superiority of the enemy ship and air forces, the Northern Fleet as a whole successfully carried out the task of escorting the convoys on the overseas sealanes.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. There were two other sealanes: across the Pacific to Vladivostok and via Iran to the ports of the Caspian Sea.
2. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 5, 1975, p 261.
3. "Boevaya letopis Voenno-Morskogo Flota 1941-1942" [Combat Chronicle of the Navy 1941-1942], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1983, p 84.
4. TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], folio 12, file 920, sheets 12, 13.
5. Ibid., folio 398, file 34700, sheet 49; folio 12, file 95, sheets 61-64.
6. Ibid., folio 11, file 17814, sheets 61, 62; folio 398, file 34700, sheet 49.
7. D. Irving, "Razgran konvoja PQ-17" [The Defeat of Convoy PQ-17], translated from the English, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971, p 352.
8. VOENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1971, p 27.

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CSO: 1801/152

## **DEVELOPMENT OF FIRE PLAN IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT**

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 24 Jan 86) pp 16-21

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col A. A. Pastukhov; the article was written from the experience of the Great Patriotic War]

[Text] The fire plan on the defensive, as a combination of deliberate fire organized according to a single plan for all types of weapons, underwent significant development during the years of the Great Patriotic War. As a result of the qualitative improvement and the greater number of weapons in the subunits, units and formations, there was a change in the depth of their echeloning and effective placement, the depth and density of the zones of fire by antitank weapons and zones of solid multilayered fire by firearms and other types of weapons as well as the degree of fire support for the boundaries and flanks.

**The depth of the fire plan gradually increased.** The Soviet troops at the outset of the war went on the defensive on a broad front while their subunits, units and formations possessed a limited amount of weapons, particularly antitank ones. As a result, the fire plan in the formations did not exceed 3-5 km in depth.(1) With greater fire and combat capabilities of the rifle units and formations, the depth of the fire plan increased. Thus, during the defensive of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad, it already reached 6-8 km.(2) Here the firing of all weapons was readied not only in front of the forward edge but also in the tactical depth at the most important sectors. The further echeloning of the battle formations led to an increased depth of the fire plan. By the second period of the war, in the main defensive area it was 6-7 km, and in the second 3-4 km. Particularly noticeable was the greater depth of the fire by antitank weapons. While at the start of the war this did not exceed 2-3 km, at the end of it it had already reached 6-8 km, that is, had increased by almost 3-fold.(3)

**The density of the weapons and fire increased.** The desire for the even distribution of artillery along the entire defensive front with a shortage of weapons in the subunits, units and formations at the outset of the war led to a situation where the average densities for field pieces were from 5 to 18 units while for antitank weapons did not exceed 1-4 pieces per kilometer of front.(4) In rifle weapons it was possible to achieve a density of 5-6

bullets per minute per linear meter ahead of the forward edge. By the end of the war, the artillery density on the most important sectors in individual operations reached 100-120 guns per kilometer of defensive front, including 20-25 antitank barrels. The increased number of automatic rifle weapons, chiefly machine pistols made it possible to achieve a fire density up to 13 rounds per minute per linear meter of front and on individual major sectors up to 15-19 rounds.(5) However, due to the comparatively short range of effective fire by the machine pistols, the depth of the high density zone of solid fire from rifle weapons was cut in half.

During the war years, extensive was made of the **maneuvering of weapons and fire** from depth and from unattacked sectors. For example, during the defensive period of the Kursk Battle several artillery and mortar units from the 13th Army were shifted to the area of Ponyri. As a result, here the artillery density increased from 36.3 to 84.3 guns per kilometer of front and this made it possible to repel the massed enemy tank attacks.(6) In the Balaton Defensive Operation in March 1945, due to maneuvering, artillery density was brought up to 160-170 guns per kilometer of front on individual sectors.

The maneuvering of fire underwent great development, that is, the shifting it along the front and in depth in the course of combat (the operation) from some targets to others (without changing firing positions) with the task of the dependable hitting of them in a short period of time. This type of maneuver was employed most frequently when the defensive was carried out in comparatively narrow sectors while the weapons possessed a sufficiently high firing range. The extensive maneuvering of fire to a significant degree compensated for the shortage of weapons inherent to the defensive and made it possible to achieve fire supremacy over the enemy at the essential moment and on the crucial sector.

During the war years, characteristic of the fire plan was the **ongoing rise in the proportional amount of artillery fire in it**. The limited amount of artillery at the outset of the war led to a situation where the fire of small arms supplemented by the fire of guns and mortars comprised the basis of the fire plan in the defenses of divisions.

In the second and third periods of the war, the fire plan was based upon the firing of guns and mortars supplemented by the firing of machine guns combined with man-made obstacles. The proportional amount of artillery was increased in fighting against enemy tanks, artillery and infantry. They began to plan for more different types of fire, particularly massed fire (MO) and creeping barrage fire (PZO). While at the start of the war massed fire was virtually not used (at Stalingrad a maximum of a regiment was used for this, and at Kursk five-seven battalions), in February 1945, for example, the 19th Rifle Division prepared two sectors of massed fire involving two artillery regiments, a battalion of heavy howitzers and a cannon artillery brigade.(7) The fire of rocket artillery began to be widely used in the fire plan.

Indicative in this regard is the organizing of the fire plan in the 108th Rifle Division in the battles on the Ruzhany bridgehead in September-October 1944 (Diagram 1). Seven antitank strongpoints were fully equipped and each of



these had four guns and two or three antitank rifle squads. The battalion and regimental artillery was distributed to the antitank strongpoints, while the divisional artillery and the 120-mm mortars comprised infantry support groups. The artillery firing positions were echeloned in depth. In the area of the division, 3 sectors for long-range fire attack (DON) were prepared, 23 sectors of SO (including 7 in depth) and 3 sectors of PZO. NZO [fixed barrage fire] covered virtually the entire area of the division and on the flanks lines of barrage fire were prepared directly ahead of the positions of the second echelons of the regiments and the division. In addition to this, provision was made for SO and ZO [barrage fire] ahead of the front of the adjacent divisions as well as the massing of fire by several battalions against the most important objectives.(8)




Diagram 1. Fire Plan of 108th Rifle Division  
on Defensive on Ruzhany Bridgehead in October 1944

- Key: 1--Zone of solid fire from small arms  
2--Long-range fire attack (DON)  
3--Massed fire (MO)  
4--Fixed barrage fire (NZO)  
5--Creeping barrage fire (PZO)  
6--Concentrated fire (SO)  
7--Deployment lines of artillery reserve

Regardless of the greater role played by artillery, the firing of small arms up to the end of the war remained a compulsory and important component in the overall fire plan. A zone of solid small-arms fire was established in front of the entire forward edge of the main zone as well as ahead of the front of the rifle battalions at each position in the defensive depth. Great importance was given to group (volley) fire which was used in firing at lines to out off the infantry from the tanks, in firing at low-flying aircraft and in carrying out concentrated fire. Initially with the fire of guns and mortars the sectors of concentrated fire and the lines for fixed barrage fire of medium machine guns were laid out. Certain general indicators for the development of the fire plan are given in the table.



# Certain Average Indicators for Fire Plan of a Rifle Division on the Defensive

| Indicators  | Prewar Views | ----- Periods of War ----- |        |         |
|---|--------------|----------------------------|--------|---------|
|   |              | First                      | Second | Third   |
| Density of guns and mortars per km                          | 14-18        | 5-18                       | 15-37  | 20-60   |
| Artillery capabilities of rifle division for setting:       |              |                            |        |         |
| NZO, m  | 6,660        | 2,320                      | 6,570  | 7,400   |
| PZO, m  | 1,500        | 600                        | 800    | 1,000   |
| Depth of fire plan, km                                      | 6-8          | 3-5                        | 6-7    | 6-8     |
| Depth of solid fire zone of small arms, m                   | 400          | 400                        | 400    | 200-400 |
| Density of small arms fire, rounds/minute/linear m of front | 5            | 1.2-1.6                    | to 10  | 9-12    |

In the organization of the fire plan, there was a continuous improvement in the fire support for the boundaries and flanks as the most vulnerable points in the battle formations of the defending troops. Commencing with the Kursk Battle, for these purposes they planned strikes by artillery and other weapons, the maneuvering of fire was designated, cooperation was organized among the allocated weapons, and the representatives of the units and formations drew up plans with the appending of the fire plan. For achieving maximum coordination of actions among the units and formations responsible for the boundaries, it was the practice of holding special exercises and military games for them. Testing the readiness of the resources allocated for this was systematically organized. All the weapons assigned to support the boundaries were located in such a manner that it was also convenient to fire from them ahead of the front of the adjacent unit.

The fire system was combined with a system of man-made obstacles. The latter were erected so that the enemy, in crossing them, was forced to come under flanking fire. The obstacles without fail could be fired on by machine guns, antitank weapons and artillery.

The fire plan organized in this manner on the flanks provided positive results. For example, the enemy attack in the boundary between the 148th and 81st Rifle Divisions in the defensive at Kursk was unsuccessful.(9) Equally effective was the fire plan on the boundary of the battalions of the 140th and 142d Guards Rifle Regiments and the 646th Rifle Regiment of the 152d Rifle Division on the defensive in the area of the population point of Apostolovo in February 1944 (Diagram 2). The enemy did not succeed in broadening the breach

which was formed here. Moreover, two of its infantry battalions were in a pocket of fire and suffered losses.




Diagram 2. Fire Support of Boundaries Between Battalions of Rifle Regiments of 152d Rifle Division (1944)

Key: 1--Position of sides at 0230 hours of 14 Feb 44  
 2--Position of sides at 1500 hours of 14 Feb 44  
 3--Firing of 142d Guards Rifle Regiment  
 4--Firing of 646th Rifle Regiment  
 5--Firing of 140th Guards Rifle Regiment




Diagram 3. Fire Plan for Rifle Division on Defensive  
From Experience of Great Patriotic War

- Key:
- 1--Zone of small arms fire
  - 2--Zone of antitank fire
  - 3--Solid fire zone
  - 4--Fire of unit to the right
  - 5--Long-range fire attack (DON)
  - 6--Area of massed fire (MO)
  - 7--Sectors of concentrated fire (SO)
  - 8--Sector of creeping barrage fire (PZO)
  - 9--Sector of fixed barrage fire (NZO)

In the course of the war the methods of planning fire and controlling it in the course of combat were improved. In organizing the fire system during the first period there were substantial shortcomings: the lack of observation of the targets, the poor fire cover of the antitank and antipersonnel obstacles, the poor organizing of cooperation between different weapons, the lack of their maneuver to threatened sectors from unattacked ones. Clearly erroneous was the desire to position the divisional artillery away from likely tank approaches and behind natural barriers.

Subsequently, with the gaining of combat experience by the command personnel, the fire plan began to be organized according to a single plan with a clear distribution of questions to be solved among commanders of all levels. The divisional commander organized the fire of all types of weapons ahead of the forward edge and deep in the division's defensive zone as well as the fire support for the boundaries and flanks. A regimental commander organized the fire of the regimental weapons and set the tasks for the battalions to establish crossfire on the boundaries and deep in the regiment's sector. A battalion commander set the order for using the TOE and attached weapons and also organized fire cooperation between the companies and adjacent subunits. As a result by the war's end, the fire plan had reached its greatest development and to a significant degree contributed to raising the stability of the defenses of the Soviet troops (Diagram 3).

The commanders showed greater skill in organizing antitank fire which was the basis of the fire plan of the subunits, units and formations. Large-caliber artillery began to be used more and more actively in combating tanks. For example, in four antitank strongpoints of the 78th Guards Rifle Division of the 7th Guards Army in July 1943, there were 12 122-mm howitzers.(10)

Tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] began to be more widely used in the antitank fire plan. Thus, in the Battle of Kursk, the 1440th Self-Propelled Regiment, the 230th, 262d and 245th Separate Tank Regiments which had been attached for reinforcement were incorporated in the antitank defenses of the first echelon divisions of the 6th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front. This surpassed by almost 2-fold the density of the antitank weapons in the defensive areas of the divisions.(11)

As a whole, the experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that the fire plan should be based on the firing of guns and mortars closely coordinated with air strikes while the small-arms fire should merely supplement this. The fire plan should provide the hitting of the enemy starting from the greatest possible distances, the increasing in the might of all types of fire as it comes closer to the forward edge and the hitting of the enemy deep in the defenses. For increasing its effectiveness, it is essential to mass the weapons on the most important sectors in the aim of achieving maximum densities here, to echelon them in depth, to organize and constantly maintain close fire coordination between them, to broadly maneuver the fire and weapons to a threatened sector, and to closely coordinate the fire plan with man-made obstacles, natural and artificial barriers.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. B. I. Nevzorov, "Razvitiye sovetskogo voyennogo iskusstva v pervom periode Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [The Development of Soviet Military Art in the First Period of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1978, p 42.
2. "Taktika v boyevykh primerakh. Diviziya" [Tactics in Combat Examples. The Division], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976, p 225.

3. "Razvitiye taktiki Sovetskoy Armii v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny (1941-1945 gg.)" [The Development of Soviet Army Tactics in the Years of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1958, pp 306, 309.
4. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 345, inv. 5487, file 48, sheets 182-186.
5. "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" [The History of Military Art], Moscow, Izd-vo VAF, Book 2, 1961, p 489.
6. TsAMO, folio 361, inv. 6079, file 223, sheets 41, 42.
7. "Razvitiye taktiki Sovetskoy...", p 311.
8. "Sbornik boyevykh primerov iz opyta Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Combat Examples From the Experience of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, pp 111-114.
9. TsAMO, folio 361, inv. 6079, file 223, sheet 38.
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## SHOCK GROUP OPERATIONS IN BREACHING FORTIFIED AREAS, CAPTURING CITIES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 24 Jan 86) pp 22-29

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col B. N. Petrov]

[Text] In the course of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military art was enriched with the instructive experience of fighting to breach enemy fortified areas and capture cities. The strongest fortified areas were breached by Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus, in East Prussia, Poland, the Carpathians, the Crimea, on the Budapest and Berlin sectors as well as in Manchuria. During the war, the fight for a city assumed great scope. On the territory of certain states where Soviet troops fought, there were one or two large cities every 200-300 km. The capturing of many of them was the main aim of the army and front offensive operations while the fight for Budapest, Vienna, Berlin and other cities was of operational-strategic significance.

The fortified areas (UR) differed from one another both in terms of design as well as in terms of position in the system of enemy defenses. However, a common feature of all of them was the concentration of particularly strong reinforced concrete and armored structures with special artillery and machine gun weapons. For example, in the Helsingborg UR in East Prussia alone there were 911 permanent firing structures (pillboxes).(1) In Manchuria, the strongest was the Border UR which had 643 main engineer structures.(2)

The placement of the pillboxes ensured their coordinated firing and the possibility of firing across all terrain lying in front to a depth of 300-500 m. The spaces between the pillboxes, strongpoints and centers of resistance were covered by field-type fortifications. On the most exposed sectors ahead of the forward edge of a fortified area there was a position for battle outposts and a forward security zone was established with antitank and antipersonnel obstacles (see the diagram).

The defense of a large city usually included several zones (perimeters) the basis of which was the coordinating centers of resistance and strongpoints. A strongpoint was one or several of the strongest multistory buildings suitably located in a block and adapted for all-round defense. The windows and doors of the houses were closed up with brick or sandbags and in the walls firing slits and loopholes were built. Usually the weapons were positioned in




Diagram of Strongpoint of Raudonen Center of Resistance

- Key:
- |  |                           |
|--|---------------------------|
| 1--Three- and six-slit pillbox               | 10--Trench                |
| 2--Minefield                                 | 11--Communications trench |
| 3--Strengthened wire fence                   |                           |
| 4--Wire entanglement in 5 rows of stakes     |                           |
| 5--Net on short stakes                       |                           |
| 6--Antitank trench                           |                           |
| 7--Metal antitank hedgehogs                  |                           |
| 8--Reinforced concrete antitank tetrahedrons |                           |
| 9--Trench and machine gun emplacement        |                           |

several tiers, providing a multilayered fire on the approaches to the building and fighting inside it. Between the buildings trenches and communications trenches were dug, barricades were erected, and antitank and antipersonnel obstacles set out. The network of city underground utilities was widely used for the maneuvering of subunits.

Combat experience showed that in breaking through fortified areas and in taking large cities, even in the course of extensive artillery and air softening up, it was impossible to count on the complete destruction or neutralization of the enemy pillboxes and strong stone buildings adapted for defense. For this reason, it was often necessary to establish in the troop battle formations temporary units which were specially trained and prepared for sealing off and destroying (storming) individual strongpoints and firing positions of the permanent type and to carefully organize their actions together with the artillery, tanks and combat engineers. In the course of the war in breaking through fortified areas and in capturing large cities, shock groups and shock detachments were extensively employed.(4)

Shock groups were established in the rifle battalions by an order of a regiment commander. Their number was determined by the number and nature of the objectives to be attacked (usually two or three shock groups per battalion). A regular rifle subunit (platoon, company) was the basis of a shock group and ordinarily two or three tanks or SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], two antitank guns, two guns of divisional artillery, up to a platoon or combat engineers, a squad of flamethrowers and chemical troops (for setting a smokescreen) were assigned to it.(7) The shock group was commanded by an all-arms officer, usually the commander of a rifle company. An officer of the engineer troops was his deputy. In certain instances the shock groups were headed by officers of the engineer troops, as was the case, for example, in the 11th Guards Army in breaking through the Stallupenen Fortified Area in October 1944.(8)

The shock groups in breaking through fortified areas comprised the basis of the battle formations of the first echelon units. Since they were temporary formations, their organizational structure on the different fronts and in the various operations was not constant. But most frequently in organizational terms a shock group included: a reconnaissance and obstacle clearing subgroup consisting of combat engineers which were given the mission of engineer reconnaissance of the objective and the approaches to it and for making or widening the passages through the wire obstacles and minefields on the approaches to the object to be attack; a fire subgroup with the mission of suppressing the structure to be attacked and the adjacent firing positions which could oppose the shock group's attack; a destruction subgroup consisting of combat engineers for destroying the fire structure; a nucleus (riflemen and submachine gunners) which carried out the mission of supporting the approach of the destruction subgroup to the structure to be attacked as well as its direct capture.(9)

The personnel of the shock group was armed with submachine guns, hand and antitank grenades and was equipped with steel vests and small shovels. The combat engineers in addition had mine detectors, probes, snippers for cutting

wire, hooks with rope, bangalore torpedoes and shaped charges, sandbags and travois.

The specific combat conditions in breaking through the fortified areas demanded valor, steadfastness, resourcefulness and good physical training from the men of the different branches of troops and primarily the infantry which bore the main burden of combat. In this context the shock groups were manned with young (not over 35), physically strong soldiers who were best trained in tactical and weapons terms.

Much attention was paid to the preliminary training of the shock groups as well as to the careful organization of their combat. For example, in the 21st Army of the Leningrad Front, on the eve of the Vyborg Operation 30 hours were allocated for training the shock groups.<sup>(10)</sup> The exercises, as a rule, were conducted at the training fields which were equipped with field and permanent defensive structures characteristic of the enemy. The infantrymen who comprised the nucleus of the assault group were trained together with the attached and supporting artillery, tank and combat engineer subunits in a situation similar to the one in which they would have to fight. The personnel of the shock group was trained in the prompt and correct taking up of the jump-off position for the attack and in the ability to cross enemy obstacles, to quickly close with the objective being attacked, to seal off and destroy it as well as conduct hand-to-hand combat.

Particular attention was paid to the quick rush from a distance of 100-150 m after the intense shelling. The shock group was to cross this distance in not more than 1 or 2 minutes. The artillery troops, tank troops and flamethrower troops were instructed initially in fighting as part of a team or crew and then in precise cooperation with the infantry and other branches of troops as part of the shock groups. The combat engineers were trained in the reconnoitering of man-made structures and obstacles, in their crossing and destruction and in the ability to seal off and destroy the pillboxes.

Extensive work was done to create a party and Komsomol organization in each shock group and to select and train the men who were to be the first to rise to the storming of the enemy fortifications and lead the men with them. For this, as a rule, communists, Komsomol members and experienced soldiers were chosen. In the units it was a practice to hold meetings for the combat aktiv where participants in the capturing of pillboxes, combat engineers and tank hunters shared their experience of shock operations.

The combat operations of breaking through the fortified area were preceded by careful reconnaissance of the pillboxes to be captured by the shock groups. This was basically carried out by surveillance in the process of which they determined the nature of the structures, the position of fire slits, the fire sectors, the weapons, the dead spaces and most dangerous approaches. Reconnaissance also established the nature and types of obstacles and entanglements covering the approaches to the defensive structures. Initially these were studied by the commanders of the shock groups and when the troops had taken up the jump-off position also by the entire personnel of the subunits. On the basis of generalizing the reconnaissance data concerning the objectives to be attacked, the procedure and methods of attacking and



destroying the pillboxes were determined and the cooperation of the shock groups with the infantry, tanks and artillery was also organized. The battalion commander personally gave the mission for the fighting to the shock group.(11)

Usually the following procedure was used for the actions of a shock group. For attacking a pillbox on the forward edge, the group advanced with the first extended infantry line in the direction set for it. The personnel by crawling and short dashes or on travois and armored carts behind the tanks (SAU) under the cover of artillery fire moved to 100-150 m from the structure, bringing up the bangalore torpedoes and shaped charges, boxes with explosive and sandbags. On this line the fire subgroup by firing all types of weapons neutralized the attacked object and adjacent firing positions and also destroyed the field troops covering them. The chemical troops moved up ahead and with smoke grenades or charges set smokescreens in front of the firing slits as well as on the flanks of the shock group. At this time the destruction subgroup made passages in the obstacles covering the object being attacked and cleared the way for the actions of the nucleus and destruction subgroup. The men from the nucleus of the shock group rushed the trenches of the external defense of the object being attacked and fighting with bayonets, submachine gun and grenade, destroyed the enemy, supporting the approach and actions of the destruction subgroup. Simultaneously the tanks and SAU by their firing neutralized the pillbox and through the passages made approached right up to the firing slits, covering them with their hull. Under the cover of the fire subgroup, the nucleus and the tanks, the destruction subgroup quickly advanced to the structure, sealed the firing slit with sandbags and other available materials and then with shaped charges or boxes with explosive blew it up. The destruction of the remnants of the enemy garrison was carried out by the men of the nucleus in weapons and hand-to-hand battle using grenades, explosive, smoke charges and flamethrowers.

A shock group, as a rule, attacked a weapon emplacement of the double caponier type from the front and from the side of the entrance. A frontal-firing weapon emplacement was sealed off by firing against the fire slits from a heavy weapon and the firing of snipers from the front, attacking from the flanks and from the rear. Multislit weapon emplacements were attacked from the front and for this the firing of all the weapons was concentrated on one of the slits and which by localizing the assault group could quickly approach the firing point and destroy it. Simultaneously a portion of the shock group attacked the structure from the flank. If the weapon emplacement had an armored turret with an all-round traverse, then this was first blocked by the firing of the guns, tanks or SAU and under the cover of a smokescreen was attacked after artillery fire at it.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that the actions of shock groups with their careful training and sufficient reinforcing were very effective. Indicative are the actions of the shock groups of the 17th Rifle Regiment of the 5th Guards Rifle Division in breaking through the Stallupenen Fortified Area in October 1944. The shock groups advanced with the rifle battalions which by massed fire tied down the enemy, cut it off from the emplacements being attacked, isolated them and thereby made it possible for the shock groups to destroy the pillboxes. For the assault they selected the



largest three- and six-slit pillboxes as with the fall of these the enemy defenses were disrupted. The success of capturing the enemy emplacements was ensured by the bold and decisive actions.(12)

In the Manchurian Operation (August 1945) one should note the experience of breaching the Volyn Fortified Area by the LXXII Rifle Corps of the 5th Army at night, without artillery and air softening up. For carrying out this difficult mission, an important role was played by the sudden bold and decisive actions of the forward battalions which under the cover of darkness enveloped the designated strongpoints from the flanks and rear and began to seal off the enemy pillboxes. The destruction of the sealed off emplacements was carried out by shock groups which, in using explosives, backpack flamethrowers, smoke charges and grenades and cannisters with gasoline, smoked and burned the enemy out of the pillboxes, dugouts and covered communications trenches. As a result, by the morning of the first day of the offensive, the defensive system of the fortified area was disrupted and good conditions were established for its breaching and the developing of the offensive into the interior of Manchuria.(13)

In developing the offensive, the troops of the 36th Army of the Transbaykal Front encountered the fiercest enemy resistance at the Hailar Fortified Area. Two rifle divisions (94th and 293d) and heavy artillery units were assigned for sealing off and eliminating its garrison. After careful reconnaissance and the establishing of shock groups, the troops began to attack the enemy fortifications. The shock groups destroyed first of all those enemy pillboxes which most impeded the advance of our units and then sealed off and destroyed the remainder. A major role was assigned to the demolition combat engineers which were part of the shock groups. For eliminating the garrisons in the major defensive structures, they initially blew up the mesh protecting the ventilation ducts of the underground shelters into which explosives were then lowered and detonated. After the capture of the weapons emplacements the team of demolition troops destroyed them completely.(14)

The organization and methods of combat of the shock groups in capturing large cities, like breaking through the fortified areas, varied and were determined by the content of the tasks set and by the nature of the objectives being attacked. From the combat experience for the large cities of Nazi Germany in the troops of the First Belorussian Front, for example, the shock groups included: a platoon -- company of infantry, one or two combat engineer squads, three-five backpack flamethrowers, two-three chemical warfare specialists with smoke-making and incendiary equipment, a squad of antitank rifles, three or four guns and two or three tanks (SAU). In the aim of the successful carrying out of combat missions and the best cooperation within the shock groups, they were divided into subgroups: attack which included the submachine gunners, demolition combat engineers, chemical troops as well as tanks or SAU; fire which included machine gunners, antitank gunners, snipers and artillery troops; the headquarters cell which included radio operators, signal rocket firers, messengers and two or three submachine gunners for protecting the observation post of the assault group commander.(15) Frequently other subgroups were established including: reconnaissance and obstacle clearing, destruction, holding and a reserve.(16)

The attacking and capturing of a separate building was, as a rule, the mission of the shock group. The storming of it was preceded by its complete or partial destruction by artillery fire or air strikes lasting from several minutes to several hours. Large-caliber weapons (122-152-mm) were used in the artillery softening up from firing positions located as close as possible to the target (40-150 m). Tanks and SAU fired at the lower stories while the 45-76-mm guns fired at the firing slits, windows and attics, destroying or neutralizing the enemy firing positions and observation posts. Artillery fire was also used for making holes in the walls of buildings and stone (brick) walls.

A shock group fought, as a rule, in the battle formation of the advancing battalion or as part of a shock detachment. The commander of a shock group, having received the mission of storming a building (strongpoint), sent ahead the reconnaissance and obstacle clearing subgroup which ascertained the nature of the enemy defenses, paying special attention to the detection of previously undiscovered structures on the approaches to the object. At the same time, a portion of this group cleared passageways for the moving up of the destruction subgroup. The machine gunners and crews of antitank rifles, in using dead spaces, courtyards, parks and municipal structures, took up positions for firing at the firing slits and windows of the buildings and at the exits. Openings in walls, fences, communications trenches and underground structures were employed to approach the object being attacked. Smokescreens and vertical camouflage nets were widely employed. Before attacking individual, particularly strong buildings, the shock group first seized two or three adjacent buildings and thereby ensured the possibility of a covert approach to the object of the attack and the taking up of firing positions by the artillery by direct laying. When it was impossible to move up guns for direct laying, the buildings were blown up. Combat engineers under the cover of small arms and machine gun fire crawled to the object being attacked and laid explosive charges under the building walls. The charges were detonated before the start of the attack.

The building was attacked usually in the course of the weapons softening up, at the moment the artillery fire was shifted to the upper stories or immediately after the demolishing of the walls. This prevented the enemy from taking up firing positions in an organized manner and getting ready to repel the attack. Approaching the object of attack from different directions, the men of a shock group fired on the windows and firing slits, they threw hand grenades at them and broke into the building, destroying the enemy in rooms, corridors and the landings of the lower stories and sealing off the basements and attics. Here they widely used flamethrowers, bottles with burning liquid and thermite charges. The tanks (SAU) which were part of the shock group were employed in destroying the weapons emplacements impeding the advance of the infantry. When necessary the tanks using their own hull closed off the enemy machine gun firing slits which were in the semibasements. In all instances the tanks were covered by infantry groups consisting of four or five submachine gunners. Moving into the building right behind the attacking subgroup was the holding subgroup. This completed the destruction of the enemy garrison and immediately established a fire plan, thwarting the enemy's attempt to relieve the attacked object. The main personnel of the shock

group, not becoming involved in extended battles inside a building, survived intact to attack the following object.

Combat experience showed that in capturing buildings and strongpoints in cities, bold and enterprising actions even by small groups assumed important significance. Thus, in the storming of Poznan, the large old castle which had been turned by the Germans into a powerful strongpoint was softened up by the artillery for 7 hours. After the artillery softening up, 7 men from a shock group of the 236th Guards Rifle Regiment succeeded in breaking into the central entrance and supporting the advance of the battalion inside the building. The fighting lasted all night and by the morning of 11 February 1945, the castle had been cleared of the enemy. The 80 men who stormed the building captured 600 prisoners and a large amount of weapons.(17)

In a future war, if the imperialists start it, the possibility is not excluded of a troop offensive against fortified areas prepared ahead of time by the enemy. According to the views of the military specialists of the main capitalist states, fortified areas have not lost their significance and in the U.S. field manual their defense is given a significant place. In the NATO countries, Japan and other states, work is being done to reconstruct the existing fortified areas and establish new ones. The present development level of construction equipment and the presence of prefab elements make it possible in the course of a war to quickly and widely erect large high-strength weapons emplacements. In this context the experience gained during the years of the Great Patriotic War of breaking through fortified areas can be employed in teaching storm tactics to the subunits.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 10, 1979, p 89.
2. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 6, 1978, p 363.
3. [Not in text]
4. The article does not examine the organization and actions of shock detachments.
5. [Not in text]
6. [Not in text]
7. Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941-1945. Entsiklopediya" [The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. An Encyclopedia], Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1985, p 798.
8. See: K. N. Galitskiy, "V boyakh za Vostochnuyu Prussiyu" [In the Battles for East Prussia], Moscow, Nauka, 1970, p 115.

9. See: "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny"  
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10. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1974, p 15.
11. "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov...", No 18, pp 61-62.
12. See: K. N. Galitskiy, op. cit., pp 114-117.
13. "Sbornik takticheskikh primerov po opytu Otechestvennoy voyny"  
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War], Moscow, Voenizdat, No 21 (July-August 1946), 1947, p 68.
14. See: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1978, p 100.
15. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 233,  
inv. 2356, file 772, sheets 18-19.
16. "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov...", No 17, 1952, pp 31-33.
17. TsAMO, folio 233, inv. 2356, file 24, sheet 38.

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## BASIC DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN YEARS OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 24 Jan 86) pp 30-37

[Article by Maj Gen P. T. Kunitskiy published under the rubric "Organizational Development of the Armed Forces"]

[Text] Among the measures carried out by the Communist Party and the Soviet government during the years of the Great Patriotic War to mobilize all the nation's resources to repulse the aggressor, one of the central places was held by the development of the Armed Forces. This was characterized by scientific soundness, by continuity, by great effectiveness and was subordinate to the tasks of the deployment and greatest possible strengthening of the wartime army capable of defending the victories of socialism and defeating the enemy. The development of the Soviet Armed Forces was carried out in different directions which were determined by the specific situation on the front and in the rear.

An important area in the development of the Armed Forces was the **constant improvement in the organizational structure of the troops** depending upon the combat conditions, the methods of conducting combat, the quantity and quality of the military equipment, the training level of the personnel, the organization and nature of enemy actions.

During the first months of the war, because of the high losses in weapons and equipment and the low capability of the economy to produce them, the organizational structure of the troops (naval forces) had to be adjusted. The all-arms armies were organized as small in size, without corps headquarters (5-8 rifle divisions, separate tank brigades, artillery, engineer and other units and subunits). Due to the shortage of tanks in the autumn of 1941, the mechanized corps were broken up. Their personnel and equipment went to man the newly established separate tank brigades and battalions. In August, the headquarters of the long-range air corps were abolished. In the front [tactical] fighter and bomber aviation, the number of regiments in the divisions was reduced from 3 to 2 while in the air regiments the number of aircraft was reduced from 60-63 to 32-33 and in some even to 20.

From 1942, a qualitatively new period began in the development of the organizational structure of the troops. The receipt of ever-increasing amounts of weapons and equipment in the troops made it possible to begin



establishing an organization of the units, formations and operational field forces which would provide the greatest effectiveness of actions in carrying out combat missions on the offensive. Here the main principle of Soviet military organizational development, the harmonious development of all the Armed Services, as before, remained unchanged. Due to the fact that the outcome of the war was to be determined on continental theaters of operations, the Ground Forces held the dominant position in the Armed Forces. In terms of the number of personnel, during the war years their proportional amount was 87.2-80.7 percent. The Air Forces were responsible for more than 8 percent, the Navy 5.8-3.6-5.3 percent and the National Air Defense Troops 3.3-5 percent.(1) With insignificant changes in the ratio between the Armed Services, in each of them substantial changes occurred in the organizational structure of the branches of troops (forces) aimed at increasing their strike and fire power.

In the Ground Forces in 1942-1943, the corps level of command was restored in the all-arms armies. The army included cannon, mortar, antitank and antiaircraft artillery regiments. In the rifle divisions there was an increased number of automatic weapons, artillery and mortars and this sharply increased their fire power. A division had three rifle regiments and one artillery regiment, self-propelled artillery, antitank and antiaircraft artillery battalions, combat engineer and training battalions, a signals battalion, as well as support and rear subunits. With such effective strength it possessed sufficient independence for fighting. The weight of its artillery-mortar volley which in July 1941 had been 548 kg by December 1944 had risen to 1,589 kg.(2)

The organizational structure of the armored and mechanized troops also underwent substantial development. From the spring of 1942, they began organizing tank corps and, in the autumn of the same year, mechanized corps. A tank corps included three tank brigades and one motorized rifle brigade, a reconnaissance battalion, battalions of rocket and antiaircraft artillery as well as support subunits. A corps had around 8,000 men and 168 tanks.(3) A mechanized corps included three mechanized brigades (a tank regiment in each), a tank brigade, antitank and antiaircraft regiments, a battalion of rocket artillery and support subunits. As a total a corps was to have 175 tanks. By the end of 1942, the Soviet Army already had around 30 tank and mechanized corps.(4)

At the same time, tank armies were being organized and these were powerful field forces capable in offensive operations of breaking through the enemy defenses and developing the success in depth, and on the defensive, to launch powerful counterstrikes on crucial sectors. In May-August 1942, four tank armies were established (1st, 3d, 4th and 5th). The initial strength of the tank armies was mixed. They included tank corps and rifle divisions. Thus, the 5th Tank Army in the Stalingrad counteroffensive had two tank corps and one cavalry corps and six rifle divisions.

The experience of employing mixed tank armies in the winter of 1942-1943 showed that the presence of tank corps and rifle divisions in them, in possessing different combat and maneuvering capabilities, greatly impeded the organization and implementation of cooperation, command, control and

logistical support. Such armies were cumbersome, not sufficiently maneuverable and hard to command. In January 1943, the GKO [State Defense Committee] at a special session reviewed the question of the experience of the combat employment of tank armies and took the decision to organize uniform tank armies (two tank corps and one mechanized corps, artillery, antitank and special units and rear bodies). In the concluding period of the war, a tank army up to full strength usually had around 50,000 men, up to 900 and more tanks and SAU, 800-850 guns and mortars and over 5,000 motor vehicles.

Along with the tank corps and armies, from the second half of 1942, a large number of separate tank brigades (53 tanks each), separate tank regiments (39 tanks each) and separate tank breakthrough regiments (21 heavy tanks each) was organized and these were employed for reinforcing the rifle formations. The saturating of the operational army with tanks and SAU and the establishing of large tank and mechanized formations and field forces significantly increased the capabilities of the Ground Forces in conducting offensive operations with decisive aims to a great depth and at a rapid pace.

The organizational development of the artillery was expressed in the strengthening of the artillery formations. In 1942-1943, artillery breakthrough divisions and corps, cannon artillery and antiaircraft artillery divisions, heavy rocket artillery divisions and antitank artillery brigades were established. This made it possible to mass artillery weapons on the major sectors and more effectively clear the way for the infantry and tanks as well as more dependably protect the troops against enemy air strikes.

The combat experience gained in the summer and winter campaigns of 1941-1942 as well as the significant increase and modernizing of the aircraft fleet brought about major changes in the organization of the Air Forces. By a GKO decision, in February-March 1942, the long-range bomber aviation was turned into the long-range aviation and put directly under Headquarters. This provided an opportunity to use long-range aviation in a strictly centralized manner for making massed raids against objectives in the strategic and, in a number of instances, also the operational enemy rear. In December 1944, the long-range aviation was reorganized as the 18th Air Army and was put under the commander of the Air Forces with the maintaining of its purpose as a force of the Supreme High Command.

The organizational structure of the aviation of the fronts underwent a major reorganization. Prior to the war, this was divided into front (the air forces of the military districts), army (air forces of the all-arms armies) and troop (corps air squadrons). The organizational separateness of the aviation as well as the high aircraft losses at the outset of the war greatly impeded its massing on the major sectors and areas of the front. For this reason upon a decision of Headquarters, in May-November 1942, all the aviation units and formations fighting as part of the all-arms and fronts were organized as operational air field forces, that is, air armies directly subordinate to the commanders of the fronts. As a total over the war years, 17 air armies of frontal aviation were organized. Along with these major air forces reserves were established and these consisted of separate air divisions and corps of the RVGK [Reserve of Supreme High Command]. The establishing of powerful operational field forces and reserve formations of the Air Forces sharply

increased the combat capabilities of the aviation and solved the problem of maneuvering it and concentrating efforts on crucial sectors for carrying out large air operations. There was better coordination of the aviation with the ground forces and command and control of the Air Forces in the operations.

The development of the organizational structure of the Navy was carried out chiefly by increasing the light naval forces, submarines and naval aviation. A number of river and lake flotillas was formed. The defensive areas (Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk and others) were a qualitatively new organizational form. Established for the defense of naval bases, these brought together under unified leadership the naval units and formations, ground forces and aviation. This provided centralized command and control of diverse forces and closer cooperation between them. In 1943, as part of the Baltic Fleet and later the other fleets, maritime defensive areas (MOR) were organized and these brought together several naval bases.

The National Air Defense Troops also improved in organizational terms. During the first months of the war, their command was not centralized, the air defense zones were under the commanders of the military districts and this complicated the organization of an air cover for the major regions of the nation and impeded the maneuvering of air defense resources. Command of the air defense fighter aviation was invested in two persons: the air forces commander of the front and the commander of the air defense zone. In the aim of centralizing the command of the air defense resources and more efficiently utilizing them, upon a decision of the GKO of 9 November 1941, a fundamental reorganization was carried out in the air defense system. The position of commander of the National Air Defense Forces was introduced with the rights of a deputy people's commissar of defense. The air defense formations and units were taken away from the military districts and fleets and put under the commander of the National Air Defense Forces. In January 1942, the fighter aviation which carried out missions of covering objectives on the nation's territory was also put under him.

The leading trend in the further organizational improvement of the National Air Defense Troops was the establishing of large field forces and formations capable of carrying out not only tactical but also operational missions. The air defense zones which had existed in the European USSR in November 1941 were broken up and on their basis two corps air defense regions were established (Moscow and Leningrad) as well as 13 divisional air defense regions. With the subsequent increase in the air defense resources, certain formations were turned into field forces. Thus, the Moscow Corps Air Defense Region became the Moscow Air Defense Front, the Leningrad and Baku corps regions became air defense armies while certain divisional regions became corps air defense regions. By the end of the war, there were four fronts of the National Air Defense Troops.

In accord with the wartime situation and the new troop organization, substantial changes were also made in the structure of the rear services. By the order of the people's commissar of defense of 1 August 1941, the position of the chief of the Soviet Army rear services and deputy people's commissar of defense was introduced. In the fronts and armies rear headquarters were established headed by the chief of the rear services of the front (army) and



at the same time he was a deputy commander. During the first period of the war, measures were also carried out to strengthen the railroad, road, motor vehicle, food, medical and other services and special troops of the rear and the rear of the Armed Services was improved. All of this made it possible to effectively resolve the questions of the operation of the rear services, to systematize the supply of materiel for the troops and to more rationally utilize all types of transport.

One of the main areas for the development of the Armed Forces was their **greater technical equipping**. The Communist Party and the GKO, proceeding from Lenin's instructions that in a war "the upper hand will be gained by the side which has the greatest equipment...the best machines,"(5) carried out truly titanic work in organizing military production. In using the advantages of the socialist economy, under exceptionally difficult conditions (the loss of important industrial regions, the shifting of many enterprises to the East and so forth), the entire national economy was converted in a comparatively rapid time to a wartime footing and the necessary base was established for satisfying the ever-increasing needs of the front for weapons, ammunition, military equipment and supplies. This made it possible for the Armed Forces to catch up with the enemy in military and tactical terms and thereby deprive it of that advantage which it had at the outset of the war and then surpass the enemy in terms of the quantity and quality of weapons. By the end of 1942, that is, 18 months after the start of the war, the Soviet Armed Forces surpassed the enemy by 1.5-fold for guns and tanks and by 1.3-fold for combat aircraft. In the following years, this advantage increased. Here the share of new models of weapons reached: 42.3 percent for small arms, 83 percent for artillery, over 80 percent for armored and 67 percent for aviation. As a whole, the weaponry of the army by the war's end had been more than 80 percent renewed.(6) The attempts by the enemy to alter the bad balance for itself in the area of the production of military equipment was unsuccessful.

For a majority of the models of weapons and combat equipment, the advantage was also on the side of the Soviet Army. The T-34 tank which was developed at the outset of the war possessed high maneuvering qualities. The long-barreled 85-mm cannon mounted on the tank at the end of 1943 at a distance of 1,000 m could pierce 100-mm of armor. The Nazi designers were unable to develop anything similar to the Soviet medium tank. The KV heavy tank in the course of the war was replaced by the more advanced IS-1 vehicle with a 85-mm cannon and then the IS-2 with a powerful 122-mm cannon and dependable armor (up to 120 mm). In terms of fighting qualities, it surpassed the new German heavy tanks Tiger and Panther. A major advance of Soviet tank building was the development of an entire family of SAU, the SU-76, the SU-85, SU-122 and SU-152. The appearance of such combat equipment was a complete surprise for the Nazis.

Also unsurpassed during the war years was the Soviet rocket artillery. In terms of effectiveness and scale of use, the legendary katyushas had no equal in any of the foreign armies. Among the artillery systems, more powerful guns appeared: the 57-mm antitank cannons, the 76-mm divisional and regimental cannons, the D-1 152-mm howitzers, the 120-mm and 160-mm new mortars.

The IL-2 ground attack plane had high combat qualities. This aircraft successfully combined powerful weapons and dependable armor. It was a mighty weapon for the forward edge and an effective means for fighting enemy tanks. The YaK-1, YaK-7, LAGG-3 and MIG-3 fighters were replaced by the YaK-3, YaK-9, LA-5 and LA-7. As a result, fighter range increased up to 1,500 km and speed was raised by 20-30 percent. A new model ground attack plane, the IL-10, developed. The PE-3, PE-8 and IL-4 bombers were replaced by the more advanced PE-2 and TU-2. All the aircraft carried onboard radios.

Small arms were updated by the more advanced SG-43 machine gun, the PPS submachine gun and the 1943 shaped-charge antitank grenade.

Scientific and technical thought was also embodied in the development of the most advanced shells, bombs, mines and landmines. For example, due to the development and employment of composite and shaped-charge shells, armor piercing capability was increased by 5-fold. The appearance of a shaped-charge antitank bomb in 1943 significantly broadened the air capabilities to combat enemy tanks.

As a whole, in 1943 a weapons system was developed which best corresponded to the nature of the concluding operations of the Great Patriotic War.

In the subsequent years equally powerful models of equipment and weapons were delivered to the Armed Forces: modernized machine guns, the new 85-mm and 100-mm cannons, highly maneuverable BM-31-12 rocket launchers with a heavy 300-mm high-explosive shell and modernized 120-mm and 240-mm mortars. In the first half of 1945, new T-44 medium tanks, heavy IS-3 tanks and ISU-152 self-propelled artillery mounts were produced. The new I-250 and S-5 jet fighters were put into production and these had a speed of 800-825 km per hour; the IL-22 jet ground attack plane and the PE-2r bomber were being developed.

The deployment of the Armed Forces, their increased size, the more complex missions as well as the significant combat losses in command personnel acutely posed the question of the training of officer personnel. With the start of the war, 650,000 commanders and political workers were called up from the reserves and there was the early graduation of 107,000 students in the senior grades of military academies and schools and officers having combat experience were boldly promoted to high command positions. But this was not enough. In order to meet the ever-increasing demand of the fronts for command personnel, in accord with the plan of the people's commissariat of defense, the network (by almost 38 percent) and capacity of military schools were significantly expanded and there was a changeover to accelerated officer training. Junior lieutenants courses were set up for training platoon commanders in the armies, fronts and districts. There was a significant rise in the number of students in the central and academy advanced training courses for the command personnel. As a result of the measures carried out, the annual graduation of commanders and political workers from military schools was around 500,000 men and this made it possible to provide the Armed Forces with trained command personnel. As a total during the war years, the higher and secondary military schools trained around 2 million officers.(7) "We completed the Patriotic War not only not having a great shortage of officer personnel," stated one of the reports of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR People's Commissariat of



Defense [NKO], "but also maintaining a large reserve of officer personnel of all levels, starting with the platoon commander and ending with the Red Army general...."(8)

Because of the greater number of hardened, battle tested and politically mature officer personnel there was no need further for the institution of military commissars introduced at the outset of the war. In October 1942, one-man command was restored in the Army and Navy. This helped to raise the responsibility of the command personnel for carrying out the set missions and provided effective command and control of the troops and coordinated actions of the diverse forces in the aim of achieving victory.

From the very outset of the war there was the need for a major reform in the **military leadership bodies**. In the prewar years it was assumed that military operations would be directed by the people's commissariat of defense with the Main Military Council established in 1938.(9) However, the unprecedented scope of the armed struggle, the exceptional intensity and dynamicness of combat confronted the people's commissariat of defense with tasks which had never confronted previously. Under these conditions the need arose to create a more advanced and effective structure of the military command bodies on a statewide scale.

On the very second day of the war, 23 June 1941, in accord with the decree of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars], Headquarters of the High Command was formed and this subsequently was renamed Headquarters of the Supreme Command and then Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the superior body for strategic leadership over the military operations of the Soviet Armed Forces. In parallel with the establishing of Headquarters, the NKO was reorganized. The organizational structure and functions of its directorates were clarified. The commanders of the Armed Services and the commanders (chiefs) of the branches of troops and the chiefs of certain main directorates received broad powers as deputy people's commissars of defense for the type of their activity. This made it possible to increase the effective leadership of the subordinate troops and improve their training and all-round support. In July 1941, the Main Formational Directorate was established in the NKO and this was responsible for preparing the strategic reserves and bringing the operational army up to strength.

The General Staff, the main working body of Headquarters, also underwent reorganization. With the establishing of the Main Formational Directorate, the General Staff was freed from an extremely complex matter, the training of reserves, and was able to concentrate its main efforts on leadership of the operational fronts.

Under the conditions of the initial period of the war, when combat broke out along a front up to 4,500 km long and developed extremely badly for us and when the situation changed very quickly and contact of Headquarters with the fronts was not sufficiently dependable, by the decision of the GKO of 10 July 1941, an intermediate command element was formed in the form of the high commands of the sectors: Northwest, Western and Southwest. Their

establishment played a positive role in bringing strategic leadership closer to the troops fighting on the most important sectors.

The development of the organizational structure of the front and army headquarters bodies was carried out by steadily increasing the role of the all-arms staffs and as much as possible freeing them from performing functions not related directly to the planning, preparation and implementation of operations (combat actions); there was also a clear delimitation of tasks and functions between the staff subdivisions. An important trend was the greater role played by the chiefs of the branches and troops of services in the leadership of the subordinate troops. The communications system was improved and the mobility of the command posts increased.

**Soviet military science** made a significant contribution to the development of the Armed Forces. Of primary importance in the overall amount of wartime military scientific research was the work related to establishing the material basis of the combat might of the Army and Navy and the elaboration of the corresponding organizational forms of the subunits, units, formations and field forces and the effective methods of their employment. Starting from Headquarters, everywhere, in all the staffs, military academies, military schools and all levels, the experience of the development and combat employment of the troops was generalized and introduced into practice. A profound and thorough study of the wartime experience provided an opportunity to add to the knowledge, to broaden the viewpoint of the generals and officers, to test out on the battlefield the correctness of the theoretical concepts and on this basis determine the most effective areas for improving the organizational structure and technical equipping of all the Armed Services, the branches of troops (naval forces) and special troops.

The development of the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War was a natural phenomenon. It represented an integrated process and was carried out in different areas. Here the leading trend was the constant rise in the combat might of the Army and Navy on the basis of equipping them with the most modern types of weapons and military equipment, improving the organizational structure of the troops, strengthening the military personnel and improving the system of military leadership. As a result of their ongoing development, the Soviet Armed Forces honorably carried out the tasks confronting them and emerged even stronger and mightier from the war.

The successes in the development of the Armed Forces were the result of the effective activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet government which mobilized all the nation's capabilities to supply the Army and Navy with weapons, human resources and materiel in amounts needed for successfully fighting the enemy.

The experience of the development of the Armed Forces is invaluable. It was the result of the creative activities of the political, state and military leadership and was tested by the practice of war. The turning to it, its study and creative use are most important conditions for developing the present-day theory and practice of the organizational development of the USSR Armed Forces.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily. Istoriya stroitelstva" [The Soviet Armed Forces. History of Organizational Development], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1978, p 366.
2. "Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne (Strategiya i operativnoye iskusstvo)" [Military Art in World War II (Strategy and Operational Art)], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1973, p 173.
3. "Stroitelstvo i boyevoye primeneniye sovetskikh tankovykh voysk v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Organizational Development and Combat Employment of the Soviet Tank Troops During the Years of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1979, p 69.
4. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 12, 1982, p 246.
5. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 116.
6. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," Vol 12, p 242.
7. "KPSS i stroitelstvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil" [The CPSU and the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, pp 305, 306; "Partiya i Armiya" [Party and Army], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p 187.
8. Quoted in: "Partiya i Armiya," p 187.
9. A. M. Vasilevskiy, "Delo vsey zhizni" [A Cause of One's Entire Life], Moscow, Voenizdat, 5th Edition, 1984, pp 97-100.

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CSO: 1801/152

## ORGANIZATION OF PARTY POLITICAL WORK IN VISTULA-ODER OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 24 Jan 86) pp 43-48

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col V. K. Balabanov, published under the rubric: "Party Political Work"]

[Text] The Vistula-Oder Operation which was carried out by the First Belorussian Front and First Ukrainian Front with active assistance from the left wing of the Second Belorussian Front and the right wing of the Fourth Ukrainian Front was one of the most important strategic offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War and World War II in terms of its scope and military-political results. The invincible morale of the Soviet soldiers was a major factor determining the great results of the operation. In strengthening morale and in mobilizing the personnel to successfully carry out the combat missions, an enormous role was played by party political work which was organized and conducted by the military councils, the commanders, the political bodies and the party organizations.

The wide range of organizational and ideological-political measures was outlined and implemented in the preparations for and course of the operation by the military council and political directorate of the First Ukrainian Front (commander, MSU I. S. Konev, military council member Lt Gen K. V. Kraynyukov and chief of the political directorate, Maj Gen F. V. Yashechkin). The plan for the work of the political directorate in the area of political support for the operation set as the main task the mobilizing of the personnel to carry out the demands of the Communist Party, its Central Committee and the instructions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief "to complete the defeat of the Nazi Army, to catch the Nazi beast in its own lair and raise the victory banner over Berlin."<sup>(1)</sup> The political directorate directed the activities of the political bodies and party organizations at ensuring the rapid breakthrough of enemy defenses to the entire depth and a rapid advance of the troops. The attention of the political bodies was directed to intensifying indoctrination of the personnel in the rifle, tank and artillery units. The front's military council demanded that the ground attack aircraft make at least three runs over the target during each sortie. The Air Forces political bodies were to ensure the fulfillment of this demand.



Through the political bodies and party organizations of the rear units and facilities, the military council and the political directorate of the front secured interrupted delivery of ammunition, fuel and food to the troops and the prompt moving of the rear units and facilities, depots and dumps.

The political directorate directed the mass agitation work at instilling in the troops confidence in their forces and strengthening trust in the inevitable and final defeat of the enemy. Greatest importance was given to strengthening the patriotic and international indoctrination of the personnel and to a profound and thorough explanation of the Soviet Army's liberation mission. The task was set of promptly receiving and informing the troops of the releases of Sovinformburo [Soviet Information Bureau] as well as information concerning the combat successes of the front's troops. The political bodies were informed of the importance of the continuous and fresh delivery of newspapers and letters to the subunits.

The political directorate demanded that all political bodies immediately review the requests from the troops to be admitted to the party and Komsomol. It was recommended that the requests of soldiers and commanders who had been wounded be reviewed in the medical battalions.

For the actual implementation of the designated tasks and for providing aid to the political bodies, more than 50 workers from the political directorate of the First Ukrainian Front were sent to the armies and individual corps.

In the course of preparing for the Vistula-Oder Operation particular attention was paid to study by the men of the report of I. V. Stalin on the 27th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the actual implementation of its ideas as well as the demands of the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief issued on this occasion. Under the political directorate of the First Ukrainian Front there was a 2-day meeting for the chiefs of the army and corps political bodies. Its participants heard and discussed the reports: "Germany in a Vice Between Two Fronts and Our Tasks," "The Great Feat of the Soviet People in the War" and "Strengthening and Broadening the Front of the Anti-Hitler Coalition."<sup>(2)</sup> The political directorate of the front worked out a sample plan for the talks, information sessions and lectures. This was issued to the political sections of the armies, individual corps as well as the formations under the front. In accord with this plan, where the situation permitted, lectures were given and theoretical colloquiums conducted with the officers.

Upon instructions of the political directorates of the fronts, political exercises were organized for the rank-and-file and NCOs. The report and order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief were widely discussed at party and Komsomol meetings and were propagandized by the military press and visual agitation media.

The training of the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists was carefully organized in the troops of the First Belorussian Front (commander, MSU G. K. Zhukov; military council member, Lt Gen K. F. Telegin; and chief of the political directorate, Lt Gen S. F. Galadzhhev). At the assemblies and seminars conducted here, the aktiv studied the experience of party political

work gained in the previous operations and battles. The front's military council and political directorate showed great concern for the reserve of political workers and party organizers. Under the political directorate the reserve numbered up to 100 men, in the army political section 50-60 and in a division 15-20.

In the troops of the First Belorussian Front, as on the other fronts, basic attention was concentrated on propagandizing the ongoing growth of Soviet military and economic might, the increased combat capability of the Soviet Army as well as demonstrating the exhaustion of enemy forces. The demands of the military oath, the military regulations and orders were explained. For this purpose the political bodies in every possible way intensified the work of the agitators. Great attention was paid to them, for example, in the 75th Guards Rifle Division (commander, Maj Gen V. A. Gorshniy; political section chief, Col A. S. Bagnyuk). By the start of the offensive here there were 416 subunit agitators. The division's political section and the deputy regimental commanders for political affairs conducted special seminars for them on the subjects: "How to Organize Agitation Work in Offensive Combat," "The Personal Example of an Agitator in Combat," "The Work of an Agitator in Explaining the Summaries of Sovinformbyuro" and others. In addition, lectures were given to the agitators on the military-political and international situation of the USSR and on the situation in Poland.(3) Such seminars were held in all the units and formations of the front.

Party-political work in the First Belorussian Front was organized considering that the 1st Polish Army was part of it. The closest attention was paid to strengthening the combat alliance of the Soviet and Polish soldiers. This was aided by the joint meetings and assemblies devoted to the preparation of the offensive, the turning of the Polish National Liberation Committee into a provisional Polish government and to the unveiling of monuments to killed Soviet and Polish soldiers.

In considering that the men had to break through a permanent, deeply echeloned enemy defense full of a large amount of man-made structures, strongpoints and natural barriers, the political directorate of the First Belorussian Front demanded that the political bodies increase party influence on the quality of combat training, achieve the fuller utilization of the combat experience gained in the course of the war for this and intensify military technical propaganda. For the men of all branches of troops, the political directorate issued a series of instructions in a mass run. These were studied with the officer personnel. The platoon and company commanders and the agitators also had them and used them in the process of the combat training and indoctrination of the men.

In the work of the command, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations of both fronts, a key place was held by maintaining secrecy of the concentration of the troops on the bridgeheads and their camouflaging and the keeping of military secrets. Proceeding from this, the tasks for political support for the forthcoming combat operations were drawn up for the various categories of political personnel several days prior to the start of the operation. Thus, the chief of the political section of the 35th Guards Rifle Division, Lt Col I. A. Zhizhinov (First Belorussian Front), held a

conference on 10 January for the deputy regimental commanders for political affairs. A day later, meetings were held with the deputy battalion commanders for political affairs, the party and Komsomol organizers from the primary party and Komsomol organizations.(4)

During the night prior to the offensive, meetings were held in the regiments for the party aktiv and in the companies there were party meetings at which they discussed the task of ensuring the vanguard role of the communists in combat. Some 1 or 2 hours prior to the start of the artillery softening up, where the situation permitted, meetings and talks were held. The appeals of the military councils were read before the formed-up units and subunits and the combat missions were explained to the men.

One of the particular features of mass agitation work in the Vistula-Oder Operation was that prior to the attack the personnel was informed with what forces the front would go onto the offensive. This was done, in particular, upon the instructions of the military council of the First Belorussian Front. At meetings the men and commanders were informed of the approximate number of guns, mortars, tanks and aircraft.

The high offensive drive of the troops in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation was achieved largely due to the fact that the military councils, the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations carried out party political work continuously, effectively and all the more actively the more complex and intense the combat situation became.

Before breaching the enemy tactical defensive zone, the military council and the political directorate of the First Belorussian Front issued an appeal which urged the men to go boldly into storming the enemy fortifications. When the troops of the front met the frontier of Nazi Germany and entered its territory, they again appealed to the troops. Having highly praised the results of combat in the first stage of the operation, the military council and the political directorate urged the men "to aim all their forces, will, ability and determination, courage and valor at the victorious conclusion of the operation."(5)

Leaflets were an effective and immediate means for disseminating combat experience and for mobilizing the troops to carry out the combat missions. When the forward units of the First Belorussian Front crossed the Oder, enemy aviation launched powerful strikes against their battle formations and the erected crossings. In the developing situation the front's political directorate put out a special leaflet which urged the antiaircraft gunners to securely cover the infantry against air strikes while the infantry was to fire more actively at enemy aircraft using small arms. The commanders, political workers and activists used leaflets for conducting explanatory work. This immediately had a positive effect and on the following day more than 15 enemy aircraft were downed by small arms and the antiaircraft artillery. The Nazi aircraft were forced to lift to a high altitude. The losses of our troops from enemy air strikes were significantly reduced.

In the course of the operation the political bodies and the party organizations devoted their main efforts at propagandizing the examples of



courage and heroism and the combat skill of the men. The agitators provided information about feats, while leaflets and articles in the military newspapers were devoted to the outstanding men. In one of the leaflets issued by the political directorate of the First Belorussian Front, the experience of fighting against enemy tanks was generalized. It showed pictures of Heroes of the Soviet Union, the weapons commander Sgt N. S. Pavlov, the gunner Sgt F. G. Konkov and Jr Sgt D. Turayev. In taking up the experience of the bold and skillful fighters, the leaflet urged that their example be followed, that the combat skill be assimilated and the Nazi tanks destroyed by all means.

The commanders, political bodies and party organizations gave primary importance to maintaining high troop vigilance and strengthening discipline, particularly after the Soviet troops had entered German territory. The military councils issued special orders which contained an assessment of the state of discipline in the troops and measures were outlined for eliminating negative phenomena.

On the third day of fighting of the First Belorussian Front on German territory, at the political directorate a meeting was held for the chiefs of the army political sections. Here they discussed the tasks of strengthening discipline and vigilance. The political bodies and party organizations of the front initiated active work to carry out the received instructions. Thus, the military council and the political section of the 61st Army (military council member, Maj Gen D. G. Dubrovskiy; political section chief, Maj Gen A. G. Kotikov) turned to the commanders and political workers of the units and formations with a letter which indicated the need for a decisive rise in vigilance and organization. The letter was discussed at meetings of the officers and was used in mass agitation work with the personnel.

The army political section paid great attention to preparing and holding party meetings with the agenda "In the Tasks of the Party Organizations Under the Conditions of Fighting on German Territory." The political section worked out the theses of the report. These described the situation and the new conditions of fighting, facts were given of sabotage by Nazi agents as well as hostile acts by a portion of the population, and the ways for thwarting indifference and laxness were outlined. Workers from the army political section were sent to the formations and units. They provided great aid to the political bodies in politically informing the party aktiv and in mobilizing it to fight for a further rise in troop combat capability.

In the preparations for and in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, the military councils and political bodies were in every possible way concerned for strengthening the party and Komsomol organizations, for ensuring the vanguard role of the communists and for strengthening party influence on the successful carrying out of combat missions by the troops. The company and equivalent party organizations were at the center of attention. The political bodies constantly accounted for losses among the communists and Komsomol members and saw to it that the party and Komsomol organizations constantly received new members by admitting men who had distinguished themselves in combat. They carefully allocated the communists and Komsomol members to the units and subunits and took the necessary measures to promptly replace party and Komsomol organizers who were casualties. By the start of the operation,



party organizations of 4-13 persons had been established in 90.5 percent of the companies and equal subunits by the political bodies of the First Ukrainian Front. There were party groups in 5.7 percent of the companies.(6)

The size of the party organizations was increased primarily by admitting to the party men who had particularly distinguished themselves in combat. Of the 3,247 men who became communists in the course of the operation in the 5th Guards Army, 1,982 men, that is, over 61 percent, were admitted to the party in accord with the decrees of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee of 19 August and 9 December 1941 as having demonstrated examples of heroism.(7)

Since in the course of the operation fierce battles were waged, certain company party organizations of the First Ukrainian Front were brought back up to strength three or four times. Nevertheless the number of company party organizations in the troops by the end of the operation had declined by just 1.5-2 percent.(8) This was achieved due to the skillful leadership of the party organizations by the military councils and political bodies which constantly used the previously acquired experience of party organizational work.

In the preparations for and in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, political work assumed a broad scope among the enemy troops and Polish population. In the printed, oral and radio propaganda, the main place was given to showing the results of fighting in 1944 and the prospects of the ending war, the impending doom of the Nazi Army was evidenced and mention was made of its inevitable final defeat in the near future. It was insinuated to the enemy soldiers and officers that further resistance was senseless and a way out of the situation was suggested, surrendering.

In November 1944, the political directorate of the First Ukrainian Front issued and disseminated among the Nazi troops some 35 titles of leaflets with a total run of 1,650,000 copies,(9) while in December there were 62 leaflets with a total run of 3,212,000 copies.(10) In January 1945, the political directorate published 51 leaflets with a run of 9,400,000 copies, including 22 leaflets with a run of 1,932,000 prior to the start of the operation and the remainder in the course of the offensive.(11)

In the leaflets disseminated in the course of the operation, the catastrophic situation of the enemy units and formations retreating under the blows of the Soviet troops was described to the German soldiers and officers, and the slander of Nazi propaganda about the destruction of the German people in the event of Germany's defeat in the war was dispelled.

Political work among the indigenous population was based upon an estimation of the essence of Soviet-Polish relations and the aims of the entry of Soviet troops into Polish territory as well as the propagandizing of the fraternal alliance of the Soviet and Polish peoples and their armies. The political bodies of the fronts, in addition, provided effective aid to the democratic parties and social organizations, they unmasked the subversive activities of the reactionary elements and actively aided the local authorities in carrying out the tasks confronting them. Much was done in this regard by the

Department for Work Among the Polish Population established under the political directorate of the First Belorussian Front.

Among the population of the liberated Polish areas, pamphlets were disseminated unmasking the crimes of the Nazi invaders. Agitation vehicles were at work in the cities and villages, films were shown and talks and reports given. In areas still occupied by the Nazis, around 80,000 leaflets were distributed. The radio station of the First Ukrainian Front "New Life" each day broadcast for the Polish population.(12) Due to this, each day the Poles better understood the events occurring and the situation on the fronts. A predominant majority of them joyously welcomed their liberators.

In the Vistula-Oder Operation, the Soviet troops showed mass heroism and a profound understanding of their patriotic and international duty. For courage and military skill around 1,200 formations and units from the First Belorussian Front and the First Ukrainian Front received orders, while 481 formations and units were honorific designators in honor of the liberated cities.(13) Thousands of soldiers and commanders received orders and medals.

The skillfully organized and effective party political work was a most important means for influencing the spiritual forces of the men and it helped increase the moral-political and combat potential of the Soviet troops, thereby providing their high offensive drive and unshakable will for victory. This was achieved largely due to the creative use of the experience gained in the course of the war against Nazi Germany in organizing party political work, to a constant concern for its high effectiveness and results, and to the careful consideration on the part of the commanders and political workers of the conditions under which the Soviet soldiers would have to fight in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation.

#### FOOTNOTES

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CSO: 1801/152

### 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GDR NATIONAL PEOPLE'S ARMY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 24 Jan 86) pp 58-67

[Article by Maj Gen W. Zaroba of the GDR National People's Army, published under the rubric "In the Armies of the Socialist Countries"]

[Text] On 1 March 1986, some 6 weeks prior to the opening of the 11th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED], the soldiers and workers of the GDR celebrated the 30th anniversary of their National People's Army [NVA]. This jubilee is a noteworthy event in the nation's political and social life.

Three decades ago, when the foundation of socialism had already been established in the GDR, under the SED leadership for the first time in the history of the German people, a regular, truly people's army of the socialist state was created.

The GDR NVA from the very outset was organized as a socialist army on the basis of the already tested Leninist principles of military organizational development. "We must carry out this task solely in the closest combat cooperation with the USSR and its Armed Forces and with the other fraternal socialist states and their armies."(1)

Over the 30 years of its existence, the GDR NVA has come a great distance and has become a modern army and an inseparable part and dependable link in the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states.

In a close fraternal alliance with the Soviet Army and the other socialist commonwealth armies, the GDR NVA with full responsibility has always carried out the international tasks confronting it in the area of the collective defense of the victories of socialism in the center of Europe, on a line dividing the opposite sociopolitical systems. For this reason it has great authority among the people and the respect of its Warsaw Pact allies and at the same time evokes the hate of the enemies of socialism. Loyal to its obligations, the GDR NVA in the future will consistently carry out its allied duty in the interests of preserving peace and ensuring the security of our states and peoples.



**The establishing of the GDR NVA is closely tied to the history of the building of the first socialist state on German land.**

In strictly carrying out the demands of the Potsdam (Berlin) Conference (17 July-2 August 1945), the SED Central Committee and the GDR government for a number of years refrained from establishing regular armed forces. For a long time the GDR possessed only police formations and the armed defense against external aggression was provided during these years by the Soviet Army troops stationed on GDR territory.

The defeat of the most reactionary forces of world imperialism -- German Nazism and Japanese militarism -- in World War II opened up new opportunities for the struggle of peoples for peace, democracy, national liberation and socialism. On the other hand, the inseparable link between imperialism, reaction and war began to be evermore apparent.

The aggressive ruling circles of the imperialist countries felt that it was still not too late to destroy the forces of socialism by armed means or at least to throw them back in order to check the world revolutionary process. The establishing in April 1949 of the aggressive North Atlantic Bloc (NATO) was a concentrated expression of this imperialist policy.

Supported by the NATO countries and particularly by the United States, the FRG ruling circles intensely carried out a policy of strong pressure and revenge against the GDR and the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Even in the summer of 1943, for example, the first overt attempt was made to eliminate worker-peasant power and thereby thwart the construction of socialism in the GDR. The conclusion of the Paris Agreements in October 1954 opened the way for renascent militarism in the FRG to turn West Germany into the chief center of tension in Europe, and by the inclusion of the FRG in the NATO bloc in May 1955 and the formation of regular West German Armed Forces in the autumn of the same year, imperialism advanced the frontiers of its aggressive military bloc directly to the boundaries of the world socialist system. A serious threat to peace was created in Europe.

In order to defend peace, united, coordinated and energetic actions were required on the part of all peace-loving forces. It was extremely essential to increase the vigilance of the peoples and protect and multiply the victories of socialism. This was all the more essential as from history, "unfortunately it is too well known that an overestimation of its capabilities, adventurism, provocative actions, a desire for hegemony and aggressiveness are inherent to imperialism." (1a) For this reason, the concluding of the Warsaw Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid in May 1955 was an event of great historical significance. This was a decisive reply to all the imperialist plans and the threat of "obliterating" socialism from the face of the earth. For the GDR the necessity arose of organizing its own armed forces in order, together with the Soviet Union and the other states, to make its contribution to the armed defense of socialism.

**The SED has successfully carried out the complex tasks of military organizational development. First of all, it considered the fact that the German working class for organizing its own armed forces possessed only an**

insignificant amount of military personnel from among the participants of the Anti-Nazi Resistance Movement and this necessitated their training.

Simultaneously, intense ideological work was initiated to eradicate bourgeois pacifist moods among a certain portion of the GDR population and the nature of the future national armed forces was determined. The party and the government were forced to allocate significant resources for their organizational development.

In September 1955, the People's Chamber [Parliament] upon the proposal of the SED adopted an amendment to the Constitution which stated that service in the army for the sake of defending the socialist fatherland was the honorable duty of the GDR citizens,(2) and on 18 January of the following year, it ratified a law establishing the NVA and the forming of the Ministry of National Defense.(3) On 1 March 1956, the first units and subunits of the NVA took the oath and vowed to honorably defend the victories of the GDR workers. On the same day, the Ministry of National Defense officially began its activities along with the staffs of the Armed Services and the military districts. The organizing of the troop formations, military schools and other military formations commenced. By a decision of the GDR Council of Ministers, 1 March was declared to be the Day of the National People's Army.

The establishing of regular armed forces commenced on the basis of the Barracks People's Police. The party and state were confronted with the difficult task "in an historically short period of time to create a modern, battleworthy army, a politically and militarily reliable tool of the worker-peasant state which should be capable of carrying out its functions in the class struggle both with the preservation of peace as well as in defeating German imperialism in the event of a war initiated by it."(4) For this it was necessary to train personnel, to master the military equipment, to work out and introduce a military training system, and raise the moral-political indoctrination of all the servicemen to a higher level.

In the spring of 1956, during the period of the organizing of the GDR NVA, generals and officers were appointed to the senior command positions and 70 percent of these prior to 1933 had taken an active part in the worker movement. Many of them had undergone harsh tempering, participating in the Anti-Nazi Resistance Movement, fighting in the international brigades on Spanish land, battling during the years of World War II in the ranks of the Soviet Army and partisan detachments or working in the Free Germany National Committee. For example, promoted to leading positions in the NVA were such active fighters against fascism as Willi Stoph (presently the politburo member of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers), Fritz Dickel (presently GDR minister of internal affairs), Heinz Hoffmann (the former minister of national defense) and Heinz Kessler (presently the GDR minister of national defense).

The party closely monitored the observance of a class approach to recruitment in the army. Thus, in 1956, around 82 percent of the officer personnel in terms of its social origin came from the working class and the working peasantry while 86 percent was members and candidate members of the SED. However, the educational level of the officers was still insufficient. Almost

79 percent of the officer personnel had only an 8-year education obtained in bourgeois schools, 10 percent had completed 10th grade and only 11 percent had a certificate for the completion of 12 grades. Under these conditions, the training of the personnel became an urgent task. This could be carried out only by the all-round aid and support from the Soviet Union. From the very first days of the existence of the GDR NVA, the command and political personnel of all the Armed Services as well as the military specialists of all branches of troops were sent for study to Soviet military schools. Over the previous years, Soviet military academies have been completed by over 2,400 officers of the GDR NVA while almost 200 generals, admirals and officers had become graduates of the General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces.

On the basis of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and following the example of the Soviet Union, the SED has worked out the principles of military organizational development in terms of the GDR NVA. Our party has always proceeded from the fact that "first of all (it is essential. -- Editors) to learn from the Soviet Army, to see in the army of Lenin the prototype of the socialist armed forces and recognize the class and military collaboration with the valorous Soviet Army as the criterion of internationalist conviction and conduct."(5)

The demands made upon our army and its personnel in terms of technical equipping, the level of combat training, leadership and indoctrination, from the very outset were determined by two essential factors: by the rapidly growing threat to the victories of socialism on behalf of the NATO bloc and the example of the Soviet Army which is well trained, has rich combat experience and is equipped with modern weapons.

Using the achievements of the Soviet Union and the other socialist commonwealth countries in military organizational development, the young GDR army rapidly grew stronger and in a short period of time became a dependable defender of the worker-peasant state. The organizational development of the GDR NVA and the formation of it as a battleworthy military instrument of the power of the working class are inseparably tied to the 25 years of personal activity by Army Gen H. Hoffmann at the head of our army. "Under his leadership it has developed as a dependable shield for our worker-peasant state and has grown into a modern, recognized socialist coalition army."(5a)

During the first stage of development (up to 1962), the volunteer principle lay at the basis of the manning of the army. Later universal military service was introduced as the most effective system for manning the army.

The successful solution to the questions of the recruitment and training of personnel established the essential prerequisites for the rapid development of the socialist army. At present, 94 percent of all the GDR NVA officers have a higher or secondary technical education while the warrant officers and regular junior officers have 10- or 12-year educations and the corresponding special training.

In speaking about the technical equipping of the army, it is essential to point out that all the Armed Services were equipped with modern weapons for those times. Over the 30 years these have been replaced by combat equipment of the second, third and even fourth generations. Here the Soviet Union has



constantly provided great aid to the GDR. Thus, in 1957 the GDR NVA Ground Forces, along with the tested T-34 battle tank began receiving the new T-54 tank and this was subsequently replaced by the T-55 and then the T-72. Moreover, at present, the ground forces possess modern infantry combat vehicles (BMP), self-propelled and other artillery weapons, including with volley-fire systems, various antitank weapons, tactical and operational-tactical missiles. Troop air defense is equipped with antiaircraft units and missiles of varying range and purpose.

The Air Forces and Air Defense Troops are armed with supersonic interceptors, fighter-bombers, modern combat helicopters and transports as well as multipurpose antiaircraft missile complexes. The GDR Air Defense Troops, in acting in close cooperation with the air defense forces of the other allied armies, securely defend the air frontiers of the republic.

The GDR People's Navy is armed with modern missile boats, minesweepers, patrol and ASW boats, landing craft and shore missile systems. In cooperation with the USSR Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Polish Navy, the GDR People's Navy securely protects the territorial waters of its nation.

Due to the introduction of automation and the integrated combination of troop command and weapons control systems, the staffs have been able to significantly increase the clarity and smoothness of their work and more efficiently utilize the weapons and attack means.

During the first stage of the development of the young NVA, it was essential to overcome significant lags related to the development conditions and which existed in the area of combat readiness, in comparison with the Soviet Army and the other allied armies. As is known, the fraternal socialist armies by 1956 had already existed for more than 10 years and the Soviet Army almost 40 years.

The more rapidly our army approached the training level of the allied armed forces, the more effective its contribution to the Armed Defense of the GDR and the joint defense of socialism. For this reason, the young commanders and inexperienced staffs were trained in the most important questions of conducting modern combat. In their training a major role was played by the first command-staff and troop exercises. Among these the troop exercise for the NVA formations in August 1957 were of great military and military-political significance. This was the first joint exercise with the formations and units of Soviet troops stationed on GDR territory. The exercise disclosed weak points in political work, combat training and command of the troops. As a result, the conclusion was drawn to introduce diversity into working out the basic versions of fighting under different situations and the first energetic measures were taken to increase the role of the party organizations and political bodies.

In the process of further training, the GDR NVA formations significantly increased their combat capability and gained an opportunity in the single formation with the allied armies to protect the peaceful labor of the fraternal peoples. In May 1958, the NVA formations were included in the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states.



At the beginning of the 1960's, the process of the establishing of the army was basically complete. The victory of socialist production relations in 1961-1962 and the adopting of decisive measures on 13 August 1961 to defend the frontiers of the republic with the FRG and West Berlin opened up a new stage not only in the building of socialism in the GDR but also its Armed Forces.

The international situation which was newly aggravated in the spring of 1960 due to the fault of the U.S. imperialist ruling circles and their NATO allies demanded that the Warsaw Pact states strengthen the collective defense of socialism.

The SED Central Committee and the GDR state leadership gave proper attention to the questions of strengthening national defense and took important measures in the area of military legislation. In particular, the People's Chamber in February 1960 adopted the Law "Governing the Establishment of the National Defense Council." (6) Thereby the essential prerequisites were created for unified leadership over all national defense with the core being the NVA. Subsequently, in September 1961, the law was ratified "On the Defense of the German Democratic Republic" (7) and this was repealed in line with the passage in October 1978 of the new Law "On the Defense of the GDR," (8) which to a greater degree met the present-day requirements of the defense of the socialist fatherland. Since January 1962, universal military service was introduced by the corresponding GDR law. (9)

On the basis of the rapidly developing economy, new opportunities were created for strengthening the might and combat readiness of the armed forces. In the 1960's, there was the full modernization of the weapons and combat equipment, and the stage commenced of closer integration of the GDR NVA with the allied armies within the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states and intensive cooperation with the formations of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSVG]. In these same years the GDR NVA began to take more frequent participation in the exercises conducted within the Joint Armed Forces. A particularly important role in the development of our army was played by the Exercise Quartet held in September 1963. It involved men of the Soviet Army, the Polish Army, the Czechoslovak People's Army and the GDR NVA. It was directed by the GDR minister of national defense.

The next phase in the development of the army commenced at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's. This was characterized by the planned development of the GDR NVA within the Joint Armed Forces. During these years, the advantages of the collective might of socialism in the struggle for peace became apparent. Great work was started to improve the leadership bodies of the Joint Armed Forces. Together with the national commands, they began to pay particular attention to increasing the combat and mobilizational readiness of the troops and fleets, to strengthening alert duty in the air defense system, to working out long-range plans for the development of the allied armies and to conducting joint exercises and maneuvers on varying scales.

A major exercise under the code name "Fraternity in Arms" was conducted on GDR territory in October 1970. For the first time, formations and units of all the seven allied armies participated in it. A similar exercise under the same name and also involving all the coalition partners was held in September 1980 on the republic's territory. These exercises, like all the other ones, demonstrated the strong unity of the Warsaw Pact states on all questions of military organizational development. They showed the unanimous desire and ability of the Joint Armed Forces of the socialist defensive coalition to thwart all the aggressive military preparations of imperialism.

The GDR NVA takes a most active part in the measures carried out under the plans of the Joint Command. The staffs, troops and naval forces participate regularly in joint troop, fleet, special and other exercises, military games and training drills. All of this helps to increase the combat readiness of the troops and to improve the combat skills of the personnel.

The growth and successful development of our army would be inconceivable if it were not a component part of the socialist defensive coalition. At the same time, under the conditions of the greater aggressiveness of imperialism, the NVA has honorably carried out its international duty. When, in August 1961, the need arose to securely defend the state frontier with the FRG and West Berlin, brothers in arms from the Soviet Union, Poland, the CSSR and other fraternal countries, came to the aid of the GDR NVA. The same was true in August 1968 when, due to the decisive aid of the coalition member countries, it was possible to thwart the attempt of a counterrevolutionary coup directed against people's power in the CSSR.

The conclusions drawn at congresses can serve as an example of the consistency of the SED military-political course. While at the 10th SED Congress (1958) it was stated that collaboration between the young GDR NVA and the other armies of the Warsaw Pact states was deepening and growing stronger and that the joint aim was the defense of socialist victories in our nations against the intrigues of imperialist warmongers and that the ties of fraternal friendship and fraternity in arms binding us were growing stronger, at the 10th SED Congress (1981) it was already emphasized that the unbreakable fraternal alliance with the USSR and the firm strengthening of the republic in the commonwealth of socialist states were and would always remain for the GDR people the firm foundation of their security and successes in building a developed socialist society.(10)

Leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party is a source of the might and strength of the socialist armed forces, of loyalty and dedication on the part of the servicemen to their people. The leading role of the party in the GDR NVA has been carried out on the basis of tested principles. The political bodies and party organizations in their activities have strictly been guided by the decisions of the party congresses and plenums of the SED Central Committee. An important area of their daily work is to ensure the fulfillment of the orders of the minister of national defense and the demands of the main guiding documents.

Ideological and political indoctrination of the GDR NVA servicemen is carried out in a spirit of socialist patriotism, proletarian internationalism and unbreakable friendship with the peoples and armies of the Warsaw Pact states.

The principle of loyalty of the GDR NVA to its international duty and to the combat alliance of fraternal armies is expressed also in the SED documents. In the Accountability Report to the 10th Congress, the General Secretary of the SED Central Committee, Comrade Erich Honecker, said: "For our NVA...the class imperative remains to defend the socialist system and the peaceful life of the GDR citizens and likewise all the states of the socialist community, against any encroachments by the aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction.... Shoulder to shoulder with brothers in arms from the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, it should be able and ready to carry out this mission at any time."(11)

The GDR NVA carefully safeguards and develops the revolutionary and combat traditions of the German and international working class. The indoctrination of the servicemen is based upon the immortal ideas of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin as outstanding military theoretists and organizers of the armed revolutionary struggle. The men of the GDR NVA hold sacred the combat traditions of the Red sailors who participated in the Kiel Revolt and which served as the signal for the start of the November 1918 revolution in Germany, to the tradition of the Ruhr Red Army which acted against the reactionary Kapp putsch in 1920, the Union of Red Veterans established by E. Thalmann and the international brigades in Spain. The servicemen of our army particularly esteem the traditions of the German internationalist soldiers which appeared during the years of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people and in the struggle of the Anti-Nazi Resistance. At present the troop units, schools and facilities of the GDR NVA bear the names not only of German revolutionaries but also revolutionary heroes from the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

During its short history, the GDR NVA has also acquired its own traditions. The high combat and moral-political qualities of the men evidenced in carrying out the international duty of defending the victories of socialism, in daily life and during the major joint exercises of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states and other measures carried out on GDR territory in the fraternal alliance with the men of the GSVG serve as an inspiring example for those who today with weapons in hand are defending the revolutionary victories of the GDR and the entire socialist commonwealth.

The last year of 1985 with its outstanding political events and historical jubilees was particularly noteworthy for the men of the GDR NVA. Under the influence of carrying out the SED decisions, extensive political work was conducted in the GDR NVA. The activities of the political bodies, all the communists and the servicemen were aimed at the unconditional fulfillment of the class imperative posed by the 10th SED Congress.

Here an important role was played by the proper welcome for the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War and the liberation of the German people from Nazism as well as the 30th



anniversary of the formation of the military-political union of the Warsaw Pact.

The men of the GDR NVA celebrated these jubilees with the profound conviction that an unbreakable combat alliance among the socialist states is the crucial basis for socialism to have an evermore effective influence on the state of affairs in the world.

In a single formation with the Soviet Army and the other armies of the socialist defensive coalition, the GDR NVA is making a worthy contribution to preventing a nuclear catastrophe, to preserving a military-strategic equilibrium and to ensuring the peace and security of the socialist commonwealth peoples.

The GDR NVA in the course of the preparations for the 11th SED Congress is honorably carrying out the class imperative in accord with the party decisions.<sup>(12)</sup> Its men are ready to dedicate all their forces for further strengthening the defenses of the socialist fatherland.

The 30th anniversary of the GDR NVA is proof that it is a modern, battleworthy socialist army ready to honorably carry out its duty of securely defending the frontiers of its motherland and the states of the socialist commonwealth in an alliance with the valorous Soviet Army and the other fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact states.

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CSO: 1801/152

## BASIC DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IN YEARS OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 24 Jan 86) pp 68-71

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col V. P. Zaytsev and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Capt 1st Rank Ye. Ya. Dvoryanov, published under the rubric "Scientific Papers and Information"]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War persuasively showed that communications is the main means for ensuring control of armed combat and that without dependable communications it is impossible to ensure effective troop command. But it was possible to achieve continuous operation, speed in transmitting information and greater range of the communications equipment only by using advanced models.

In the 1930's, the Communist Party and the Soviet government gave great attention to equipping the Armed Forces with new equipment, including communications equipment. The use of the shortwave band and the development of new types of shortwave radios were an important stage in the development of radio equipment. The shortwave radios were introduced in all branches of the ground forces and made it possible to provide a new solution to the problem of ensuring wireless communications under the most complex combat conditions as well as reduce the number of types of radios.

The new fleet of radios had a wave band that included 170 fixed frequencies and this provided an opportunity to broaden the use of radios in all levels of command. In converting radio equipment to shortwaves, the possibility arose of manufacturing radios which could be used in the tactical command element and would be more compact and convenient for operation under field conditions. Simultaneously with the introduction of new radios into the troops, Soviet engineers and designers continued to develop more advanced models of radios. In particular, by the start of the war, the following radios had been developed and introduced: the all-arms RAT, RAF, RAFKV, RSB, RB, RBS and RRU, the aviation radios RSB-3bis, RSI-4 and RSR-M and the tank radios 9R, 10R and RSMK. For airborne troops Soviet engineers designed the radio of the Sever class. All these radios surpassed many foreign models. On the eve of the war, the Almaz antijamming equipment had been developed for the RAT radio and this provided radio printing using a Baudot device. In 1940, the troops

received an experimental model of the 2BDA-40 telegraph. The basic model of telegraph equipment in the troops was the ST-35 start-stop equipment. Morse equipment was also employed.

For organizing wire communications the Soviet Army employed advanced magneto telephones of the UNA-I-31, UNA-F-31 types and the special TAM and TAT-F telephones designed for communications of the large staffs over long distance lines as well as the KOF-33, RE-12, R-20 and R-60 telephone switchboards. Of the line wire equipment there were the field telephone cables KTF-7 and KTF-7x2, the PTG-19 telegraph cable and the pole communications lines.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War all radio and wire communications equipment underwent further development.

The basic areas for improving the radios were: increasing frequency stability, noiseproof features and range.

For frequency stabilization in the shortwave motor vehicle radios of the RAF-KV type, from mid-1942, as the master oscillator they began using the transmitter of the RSB-F radio, since the oscillations of its tube oscillator were stabilized by a quartz incorporated in the circuitry. The radio began to be called the RAF-KV-3. Its frequency stability and noiseproof features were significantly increased in line with the adoption in 1944 of the specially developed Karbid printer attachment. The radio with the attachment was tuned using interchangeable quartz devices ("X" and "Z") to two close frequencies. The use of quartz waves also made it possible to establish contact without the preliminary locating of the correspondent as well as switch quickly from one fixed wave to another.(1) The modernized radio was called the RAF-KV-4.

Of important significance was the development and introduction in 1943 of a new ultra shortwave band radio of the type A-7 and this was widely employed for radio communications in the rifle regiments and battalions, in the artillery battalions and batteries and successfully withstood testing in a combat situation. In it noiseproof features were achieved due to the use of frequency modulation.(2)

A very substantial direction in developing radio equipment during the war years was the increased range of portable radios which played a major role in troop command. This was achieved due to increasing the power in the transmitter antenna by improving the quality of the tubes and other radio parts as well as using more advanced types of antennas.

While a shortwave RB portable radio of prewar make with a power of 0.5 watts in the transmitter antenna at a maximum range of 7 km in using a dipole antenna in a telephone mode and 10 km in a telegraph one, the same type of RBM radio developed in 1942 surpassed it by 2-fold in power and provided communications over a distance of 15 km in using a "dipole" antenna in a telephone mode and 30 km in a telegraph one, while with a 7-m mast the range was 15 km in a telephone mode and 40 km in a telegraph one. The higher power RBM-5 radio of the 1944 model in using a 7-m antenna mast provided a range up to 30 km in a telephone mode and up to 50 km in a telegraph one.(3) This radio was compact, convenient to use, it required little power, and had an

extension which made it possible to conduct calls from a command or observation post up to 3 km away. It was used, in essence, in all command levels as well as the personal radio of the commanders of units, formations, fronts and armies.(4)

During the war years there was a significant increase in the range of radios used on the inferior tactical level and operating in the ultra shortwave band as a telephone. While the RRU company radio and the RBS radio of the battalion network which were in use at the beginning of the war had, respectively, a power of 0.1 watt and 0.25 watt and a range not exceeding 3-4 km, the A-7 portable radio of the 1942 model for these indicators significantly surpassed them. Its power equaled 1 watt and the range was around 8 km on slightly rugged terrain. The modernized A-7 radio which appeared in 1944 made it possible to increase its power up to 2 watts and range by almost double.(5)

The main areas for improving telegraph equipment during the war years were **reducing the time for setting it up and establishing contact, increasing average telegraph traffic and increasing range.** These characteristics were improved by modernizing the existing telegraph equipment or developing new devices and auxiliary equipment.

The set-up time of telegraph equipment of the Baudot duplex type and its adjustment in establishing contact was substantially shortened by the delivery of new telegraph equipment. While it required 4-8 hours for setting up the 2BD-2G equipment which was used at the outset of the war and bringing it to a working state (the 2BDA-40 equipment was not put into serial production),(6) only 25-30 minutes were required to set up and begin operating the 2BDA-43 equipment designed in 1943.(7) The set-up time for equipment of the Morse equipment modernized in 1944 of the M-44 type and establishing communication with it was shortened from 12 to 5 minutes and for the improved ST-35 start-stop equipment from 18-25 to 10-15 minutes.(8)

In the new design of the 2BDA-43 Baudot duplex telegraph equipment, the average telegraph traffic rose from 3,500 to 4,000-4,500 words an hour. The problem of doubling the telegraph traffic handled by the ST-35 equipment was solved by using the DP-43 duplex telegraph equipment developed in 1943.

The increased range of telegraph communications was achieved by using duplex telegraph relays of the DTA-45 type and these made it possible to increase telegraph range over permanent overhead communications lines with 4-mm steel cable from 600 to 2,000 km.(9)

During the war years, new Soviet-produced telegraph switchboards were developed to ensure the rapid setting up and more dependable operation of the telegraph exchanges. The LBK-20/12 line battery switchboard proved the best. It could receive simultaneously 20 telegraph wires (or 10 telegraph circuits) and connect 12 telegraphs of single-pole (or 6 double-pole) power supply. The switchboard had a set of connecting equipment which made it possible to accelerate the setting up of the distributing frame.



The development of telephone equipment was carried out by improving its design, increasing the range of transmission and increasing the reliability of telephone communications. Instead of the various modifications of magneto and phonic telephones, in 1943 a uniform standardized TAI-43 field telephone with magneto dialing was developed. It provided dependable communications (without incorporating repeaters) over the cable telephone lines over a distance to 25 km and over the permanent overhead steel circuits with 4 mm wire, to 200 km (the telephones produced prior to it with magneto and phonic dialing provided communications over telephone cables only over a distance to 15 km and over overhead lines only to 100 km).

The increase in the distance of telephoning was achieved by the fact that instead of a system with a microphone transformer, the TAI-43 equipment used an autotransformer anti-sidetone device. The use of the autotransformer made it possible to put the microphone power as a separate circuit and match the resistance of the latter with the resistance of the line. Here the power of the microphone put out into the line was significantly increased.

The new device also differed in its design. It had an additional headset which made it possible for the operator at the telephone control post to monitor the work of the line and take calls without using the handset. In addition, there was the possibility of receiving the conversation of two persons simultaneously.

For increasing the distance of telephone communications in 1943 the PNU-43 intermediate low-frequency telephone repeater was developed and adopted and this provided for telephone calls over the steel overhead lines to distances of up to 300-400 km. At the communications centers of certain armies and corps, they also successfully employed the one-way and two-way telephone repeaters (TOU and TOU-D) and these were additional devices and telephone sets.(10)

The new switchboards and telephones developed by Soviet engineers and designers and put into service also played a substantial role in improving the quality of telephone communications. Thus, at the end of 1942, the PK-30 field telephone switchboard was adopted and this was designed to be used in the army, corps and divisional communications centers. The PK-10 field telephone switchboard became widely used as of 1943 on the division -- regiment level. Both these switchboards possessed significant advantages in comparison with analogous obsolete switchboard devices of the KOF, R-20 and R-60 types. They weighed less, had greater capacity for connectable and switchable circuits and were marked by simplicity in use and low electric power consumption.

With the adoption of the unified standardized TA-43 telephone the need arose of developing a low capacity field telephone switchboard for the regimental and battalion levels. In 1944, Soviet designers developed such a device. The new switchboard of the K-10 type was designed for 10 numbers and provided dependable communications over a distance up to 20 km.

In 1944, work was completed on developing a field telephone exchange with a 100-number capacity of the PRTS-100 type. This was serially produced and

designed for the communications centers of fronts and armies. During the third period of the war, the army staffs began receiving the TTSA 40/24 central telephone exchange.(12)

During the war years, the military field cables underwent a complex path of development as employed in the telegraph and telephone communications lines. The problem was that the production of the cables employed in the prewar years had been halted due to the evacuation of the industrial enterprises. For this reason, after the opening up of new plants at the end of 1942, they began producing cables of simplified design of the LPTK, LTFK, OPTV, PTF-3, PTG-6 and other types.(13) In comparison with the PTF-7x2 and PTG-19 cables, these possessed lower electrical and mechanical specifications which to a definite degree reduced the reliability of the wire communications lines. This shortcoming was eliminated in the third period of the war. In August 1944, the PPK-4 field coil-loaded cable was tested, approved and put into production. The signals units also received the new RTTV-1 river single cable.

Thus, during the years of the Great Patriotic War both the radio as well as the wire communications equipment underwent significant development. This made it possible to almost completely reequip the signal troops with new facilities.(14) The means of communications used in the troops by the end of the war differed substantially from those which the Soviet Armed Forces had at the moment of the attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR and completely met the demands made upon the military equipment. They served as a sound foundation for the development of communications equipment in the postwar period.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya razvitiya voysk svyazi" [History of the Development of the Signal Troops], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1980, p 209.
2. I. T. Peresypkin, "Svyaz v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Signals in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Nauka, 1973, p 69.
3. "Radiostantsiya RBM. Opisaniye i instruktsiya po ekspluatatsii" [The RBM Radio. Description and Operating Instructions], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1946, p 3.
4. "Istoriya razvitiya voysk...", p 130; I. T. Peresypkin, op. cit., pp 68-69.
5. "Voyennyye svyazisty v dni voyny i mira" [Signal Troops in the Days of War and Peace], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, p 206.
6. V. V. Pashkov, "Bukvopechataniye po radio" [Radio Printing], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1949, pp 33-34.
7. "Voyennyye svyazisty v dni...", p 180.
8. V. V. Pashkov, op. cit., p 16.

9. "Voyennyye svyazisty v boyakh za Rodinu" [Signal Troops in Battles for the Motherland], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 177.
10. "Voyennyye svyazisty v dni....," p 181.
11. [Not in text]
12. "Istoriya razvitiya voysk....," p 208.
13. "Voyennyye svyazisty v dni....," p 143.
14. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of World War II], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 12, 1982, p 249.

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CSO: 1801/152

## ACCOUNT OF 1966 SUBMARINE CIRCUMNAVIGATION OF GLOBE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 24 Jan 86) pp 87-88

[Article by Capt 1st Rank (Ret) M. V. Filimoshin, published under the rubric "Military History Dates": "Around the World Under Water; On the 20th Anniversary of the Submerged Circumnavigation of the World by a Group of Soviet Nuclear Submarines"]

[Text] During a cold February night of 1966, several nuclear submarines which had been preparing for a joint long voyage, upon the signal of the group's commander Rear Adm A. I. Sorokin "Get Underway," slipped their mooring lines and headed to sea. At that moment none of the crew members, except the command, knew how long they would be away from their home base, across what seas and oceans their route lay and when they would return to base. Only after the nuclear subs had dove and were on their set course, the goal and missions of the cruise were announced on each of them over the intercom and in addition the appeal of the commander-in-chief of the Navy to the personnel was transmitted. In it he stated that the commenced cruise was an important event in the history of the Soviet fleet and that it would occur at a significant time when all our people were preparing to properly greet the regular 23d Congress of our Communist Party.

At their meetings devoted to the question of carrying out the crucial mission, the submariners unanimously approved the decision to dedicate the voyage around the world to the 23d CPSU Congress. Here all the sailors, petty officers and officers realized clearly that the cruise would be a severe testing for them and would require exceptional endurance, courage and high professional skill. The Soviet submarine sailors were to carry out the first joint voyage of nuclear submarines in Soviet and world history(1) and cover more than 40,000 km without surfacing.

The main tasks of the crews participating in the around-the-world voyage were the testing out of the complex installations, systems and mechanisms on the nuclear subs under various climatic conditions and temperature regimes and the generalization of numerous observations concerning the hydrological situation along the route. Moreover, they had to carry out a whole series of purely practical and scientific tasks in studying the world ocean and, most



importantly, develop cooperation, communication, control and tactical training procedures.

The route was drawn up in such a manner that the ships crossed all climatic zones, went through the equatorial zones and seas adjacent to Antarctica. The voyage was made with regular personnel. The diet was the ordinary one for our submariners. The range of spare parts did not exceed the standards set for submarines. As was pointed out by the former commander of the group in his memoirs, "the submarines which were involved in the cruise were not specially built ships. These were ordinary series-built ships built at our shipyards. The boats were equipped with equipment and weapons solely of Soviet production."(2)

The nuclear vessels were staffed by crews consisting of well-trained knowledgeable sailors, petty officers, warrant officers [michman] and officers. They were able to intelligently control the complex systems of the ship under different conditions. In truth, the crews also had a number of young specialists. Some of them had never been to sea for long. There were departments and even teams where there was just one or two experienced specialists.

Approximately one-third of the personnel was communists and the remainder were Komsomol members.

During the cruise a larger portion of the time was spent standing watches by the equipment and instruments as well as for combat training of the submariners (drills at their posts and specialty exercises). At times, several times a day, alerts were announced and always unexpectedly. This was done so that the men did not let up. It was essential to teach them to mobilize their will power and strength at the crucial moment. And there were enough natural causes for all sorts of unforeseen eventualities, for example, encountering icebergs in the Antarctic area. Even before their possible appearance, special posters warning of the danger had been hung up in the ship compartments.

The living inhabitants of the sea also required increased attention on the part of the crews. For example, an American nuclear submarine, having collided once with a whale, broke its prop and was unable to go any farther. Our boats along the way ran into killer whales which also had to be avoided.(3)

American ships appeared frequently along the course. They were promptly spotted without giving ourselves away. Here is what the military journalist Capt 2d Rank G. A. Savichev who participated in the cruise wrote about this: "Scattered here and there around the world the task forces of American ships serve as a weapon of the U.S. imperialist forces which are endeavoring to create tension in many regions of the world ocean. We felt this tension even in the rare surfacings to periscope depth."(4)

In such instances the group had to carry out complex maneuvering. And for this its commander and the commanders of the submarines at any time had to precisely know their position. The intense and able work of the navigator

groups ensured the necessary conditions for this. This is why after a complex rapid maneuver the boats were able at the precisely designated time to assemble upon the agreed signal at the calculated point. Here the group commander not only constantly received information on the actions of each nuclear sub but could also issue the necessary instructions.

The most dangerous thing under water is the loss of vigilance during a standing watch. It was enough even for a second to be distracted from watching the instruments, for example, by the watch officer for the diving planes and the sub in an instant could slip through the calculated diving depth and head for the bottom. In this instance the loss of vigilance by a single man meant danger for the entire crew.

In ensuring good coordination in the work of the subunits and the entire ship crews as well as the vigilant standing of the running watch, an enormous role was played by the officers including the commanders, political workers, engineers, that is, all of those who according to service duty should lead the crews, instruct them, and unite their will together. Here the mobilizing role of the party and Komsomol organizations was great. Due to them the submariners constantly maintained a fighting spirit and good working mood. The crews worked skillfully and accurately, including during the final stage of the cruise.

The around-the-world voyage by the group of Soviet nuclear submarines lasted a little more than 6 weeks. In reporting on this to the congress delegates, the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU R. Ya. Malinovskiy, said: "In recent years, the number of long cruises by our nuclear submarines has increased by 5-fold and they have clearly demonstrated the capacity of our glorious sailors to successfully carry out any missions in the ocean expanses from the Arctic to Antarctic. Several days ago an around-the-world cruise by a group of nuclear submarines traveling submerged was successfully concluded."(5)

The world's first around-the-world underwater voyage of a group of nuclear submarines demonstrated the enormous capabilities of our fleet, the excellent training of the Soviet sailors and their high readiness to carry out any order of the motherland. For the exemplary fulfillment of the assignment of the command and for the evidenced courage, boldness and mastery, by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, six participants in the voyage, including the group commander Rear Adm A. I. Sorokin, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union while many submariners received orders and medals.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. An individual around-the-world voyage under water was first carried out by the U.S. nuclear submarine "Triton" in February-April 1960, however this was interrupted by the forced surfacing of the boat to an awash state (see: "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1977, p 481).
2. A. Sorokin, "My s atomnykh" [We Are From the Nuclear Subs], 2d Revised and Supplemented Edition, Moscow, Izd-vo DOSAAF, 1972, p 100.

3. See: Ibid., p 146.

4. G. Savichev, "Pod vodoy vokrug zemli" [Around the World Under Water], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, pp 22, 23.

5. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 April 1966.

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CSO: 1801/152

**CHIEF MAR ARMORED TRPS A. KH. BABADZHANYAN**

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 24 Jan 86) pp 92-94

[Article by Col Gen Yu. M. Potapov, written on the occasion of the 80th birthday of Mar Babadzhanyan]

[Text] Amazasp Khachaturovich Babadzhanyan was born on 5 (18) February 1906 in a poor peasant family in the village of Chardakhly, now Shamkhorskiy Rayon, Azerbaijan. After completing 5th grade in a rural school, he had to help his parents on the farm and work as a wage laborer for the beys and rich peasants. Only with the establishing of Soviet power did much change in his life. In 1920, he joined the Komsomol and 4 years later was elected the leader of the local Komsomol members.

Young Amazasp realized that without profound knowledge it would be difficult to create and defend the new life. For this reason, without hesitation he agreed to the proposal of the district Komsomol committee to send him for study to the Transcaucasian Military School. In 1925, Babadzhanyan's rich army biography commenced.

At first it was hard to study military science and simultaneously learn Russian. But the hard work was not in vain as in 1929, Communist A. Kh. Babadzhanyan(1) completed the school with honors and was sent to the Transcaucasian Military District. Initially he commanded a platoon in the 7th Caucasian Rifle Regiment. From February 1932 through April 1933, he was the party bureau secretary of the 27th Separate Rifle Battalion. From April 1933 through October 1938, he was in command of a machine gun company, a machine gun battalion and was the assistant chief of staff of the 3d Machine Gun Regiment and the chief of a staff section of an air defense post in the city of Baku.

In October 1938, Amazasp Khachaturovich was appointed deputy commander of the 2d Machine Gun Regiment of the Leningrad Military District. In this position he participated in the war against the White Finns. He was wounded in one of the battles.

The Great Patriotic War found A. Kh. Babadzhanyan in the position of deputy chief of the operations section on the staff of the 19th Army of the Northern



Caucasus Military District. Amazasp Khachaturovich liked operational work, however during the period of the battles around Smolensk, where the 19th Army which had been shifted here was fighting, he requested that Gen I. S. Konev assign him to a command position. By the order of the army commander, maj A. Kh. Babadzhanyan was appointed commander of the 395th Rifle Regiment of the 127th Rifle Division.

The battle for Yelnya in September 1941 was for Amazasp Khachaturovich the first exam of command maturity. The 395th Rifle Regiment which had been transferred to the commander of the 102d Tank Division of the 24th Army from the Reserve Front skillfully outflanked Yelnya to the northwest and catching the enemy by surprise launched an attack toward the western part of the city. Cooperating with other units of the field force, it broke through the enemy defenses and created good conditions for liberating Yelnya from the Nazis.

The regiment of A. Kh. Babadzhanyan was severely tested in the engagements against superior enemy forces in the region of Glukhov and Putivl in the Sumi area, at the town of Tim in Kursk Oblast and on the Mius sector. But, regardless of the difficulties and setbacks, Amazasp Khachaturovich always maintained his calmness, restraint and clarity of thought. He was frequently among the personnel on the forward edge instilling in the soldiers and officers a confidence in victory over the enemy.

In April 1942, a major event occurred in the life of A. Kh. Babadzhanyan as he was sent for studies to the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. In following an accelerated course at this VUZ, in September 1942, he became the commander of the 3d Mechanized Brigade of the III Mechanized Corps. In commanding the formation, Amazasp Khachaturovich proved to be an able organizer of combat for his subordinate troops. Thus, in the course of the Zhitomir-Berdichev Offensive Operation on the approaches to Kazatin near the village of Chernorudok, in a meeting engagement with the Nazi 20th Motorized Division, the 20th Guards Mechanized Brigade(2) headed by A. Kh. Babadzhanyan, together with the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, head-on defeated two Nazi motorized regiments and captured a large amount of combat equipment and weapons.

Amazasp Khachaturovich fought skillfully and resourcefully in the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation. Thus, in planning combat to liberate the town of Chertkov, Col A. Kh. Babadzhanyan and the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, Col V. M. Gorelov, decided to leave a portion of the forces for an offensive against the population point from the east while with the main forces of the brigades to carry out a maneuver across roadless terrain and at dawn of 23 March 1944 make a surprise attack from the north and northeast. Caught by surprise, the enemy was unable to put up organized resistance and by 0900 hours on the morning of the same day was driven out of Chertkov. In continuing the offensive, the 20th Guards Mechanized Brigade, under the leadership of Col A. Kh. Babadzhanyan by the end of 23 March was among the first to reach the Dniester and successfully cross it. The motherland had high praise for the skill and heroism of the brigade's commander in organizing the crossing of this water obstacle. On 26 April 1944, Amazasp Khachaturovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In August 1944, A. Kh. Babadzhanyan was appointed commander of the XI Guards Tank Corps and was in command of it until the war's end. Under his leadership in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, the formation successfully carried out the missions assigned. The corps in a short period of time crossed the Pilica River and after defeating units of the enemy 25th Tank Division began a rapid advance toward Poznan. In just the first 3 days of the operation, the corps fought its way around 150 km. These actions were highly praised by the commander of the First Belorussian Front, MSU G. K. Zhukov. In a radio message to A. Kh. Babadzhanyan, he pointed out: "I personally commend you and the troops led by you on the bold and successful actions...."(3) At the end of January 1945, the tank troops of the formation had reached the Oder and dug in on a bridgehead captured in the region of Goritz.

The XI Guards Tank Corps distinguished itself in the course of the East Pomeranian Operation. Its rapid offensive toward the shore of the Baltic Sea, in the area of the cities of Kolberg and Treptow and toward the Bay of Danzig, again confirmed the capacity of A. Kh. Babadzhanyan for skillful troop leadership. He also energetically and skillfully commanded the corps formations in the Berlin Operation.

In the postwar years, having completed the Military Academy of the General Staff imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov, A. Kh. Babadzhanyan successfully carried out the positions of chief of staff of an army and commander of a field force. He was the first deputy commander of the Carpathian Military District. From 1959 through 1967, he commanded the Odessa Military District. For a number of years he was the chief of the Military Academy of Armored Troops imeni MSU R. Ya. Malinovskiy. While holding this position he put a great deal of energy into improving the training process and increasing the scope of scientific research. He generously passed on his combat experience to the students and faculty. In October 1967, he was awarded the rank of marshal of armored troops.

In May 1969, Amazasp Khachaturovich headed the Soviet Army Tank Troops. He made a substantial contribution to the development of this dynamic and powerful force of the Ground Troops and to increasing the might of the Soviet Armed Forces. He was a demanding and tactful military leader, humble, responsive and attentive to his subordinates and comrades. Regardless of his busy service duties, Amazasp Khachaturovich devoted a great deal of attention to generalizing the experience of the last war. He wrote the book "Dorogami pobed" [By Roads of Victory] and prepared a number of materials for the collective work "Lyuki otkryli v Berline" [The Hatches Were Opened in Berlin].

A. Kh. Babadzhanyan took an active part in the nation's sociopolitical life. He was elected a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet 6th and 7th sittings and to the RSFSR and Armenian Supreme Soviets, he was a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party and a delegate to a number of the party congresses.

The accomplishments of A. Kh. Babadzhanyan to the motherland have been highly regarded by the Communist Party and the Soviet government. On 29 April 1975, by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, he was awarded the rank of chief marshal armored troops. He has been awarded the high title of

Hero of the Soviet Union, and has received four Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, four Orders of the Red Banner, the Orders of Suvorov 1st and 2d Degree, Kutuzov 1st Degree, the Patriotic War 1st Degree, and two orders of the Red Star, the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Degree as well as many medals and also the orders of a number of the socialist countries.

Amazasp Khachaturovich died on 1 November 1977. He was buried in Moscow. In his memory a memorial plaque was put up on the building of the Military Academy of the Armored Troops imeni MSU R. Ya. Malinovskiy. The name of A. Kh. Babadzhanyan has been given to one of the Moscow squares, a street in Yerevan and a repair plant of the Ministry of Defense.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. A. Kh. Babadzhanyan became a member of the CPSU in 1928. For this see also VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1976.
2. The 3d Mechanized Brigade became the 20th Guards Mechanized Brigade.
3. Ya. Sadovskiy, "Takaya sluzhba--pobezhdatsya" [Such Service Means Victory], Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, p 85.

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CSO: 1801/152

ADM S. YE. ZAKHAROV

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 24 Jan 86) pp 94-96

[Article by Adm V. M. Grishanov; the article was written on the occasion of the 80th birthday of Adm Zakharov; Adm (Ret) Semen Yegorovich Zakharov was born on 5 February 1906 in the village of Stolpovo, now Zarayskiy Rayon of Moscow Oblast]

[Text] For him, like many of his contemporaries, the possibility of doing something with his life was provided by the October Revolution as it provided him an opportunity to study and participate in social life. In 1923, the 17-year-old lad from the Zarayskiy spinning-knitting mill joined the ranks of the Lenin Komsomol and 3 years later became a communist. Soon thereafter S. Ye. Sakharov was elected the secretary of the Zarayskiy Volost Komsomol Committee and then the head of the agitation and propaganda section of the Zarayskiy District Komsomol Committee. In 1928-1930, he studied at the worker faculty in Tambov.

In 1932, under special recruitment, S. Ye. Zakharov was inducted into the Red Army and sent for military-political courses at the Borisoglebsk Military Pilot School. Having completed them, he worked as an instructor in the political section of the Yeysk Aviation School. In 1934, Semen Yegorovich became a student on the air forces faculty of the Military Political Academy. Upon completing the academy he was appointed the deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Worker-Peasant Red Army [RKKA] for Komsomol Affairs.

In August 1938, as part of a group of workers from the RKKA Political Directorate, S. Ye. Zakharov participated in combat at Lake Khasan.

Many years in the life of Semen Yegorovich were closed tied to the Lenin Komsomol. He was the secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee. While holding this position, he devoted great attention to developing mass defense work among the youth and on the eve of the war against Nazi Germany to establishing the necessary reserves for the Soviet Armed Forces.

S. Ye. Zakharov had old ties with the Navy. While as the secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, he headed a special commission under the Komsomol Central Committee which did great work in recruiting sailor cadres the need



for which at that time was very acutely felt. As a result more than 20,000 young men who were pacesetters on the labor front were sent by the Komsomol to the training detachments of the fleets and to naval schools.

In 1939, at the age of 33, S. Ye. Zakharov was appointed the member of the Pacific Fleet Military Council. He was given the rank of divisional commissar. He spent more than 10 years in this post.

Prior to the war, the Pacific Fleet had been growing rapidly with the commissioning of new ships, the building of naval bases, airfields and short defense batteries, dependable communications were established and command and political personnel were trained. During these years, Semen Yegorovich dedicated all his strength, experience and knowledge to improving the fleet's combat readiness.

With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, an extremely tense situation developed in the Far East as at any moment militaristic Japan could attack the USSR. The main attention of the Pacific Fleet personnel was focused on constantly remaining in high combat readiness for repelling possible aggression. All party political work in the fleet was aimed at carrying out this task. S. Ye. Zakharov always responded quickly to reports and requests and was able to be where his intervention and help were needed.

In the war against militaristic Japan, most characteristic of the combat operations of the Pacific Fleet was the landing of amphibious troops in the aim of capturing the most important ports and bases in North Korea, on Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. During the period of preparing the landings and in the course of their fighting, the fleet military council directed the efforts of the commanders and political workers as well as the party and Komsomol organizations at instilling in the men an aggressive drive, courage and bravery and a sense of military duty.

In 1948-1950, S. Ye. Zakharov studied at the Military Academy of the General Staff and after completing this became a member of the Main Military Council as the chief of the Navy Main Political Directorate. In March 1953, he became deputy chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and a year later was appointed the first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces. From 1956, S. Ye. Zakharov was the chief of the Northern Fleet Political Directorate, and from 1957, was a member of the Military-Scientific Council of the Main Political Directorate. From April 1959 through 1950 he was the deputy chief of the naval schools.

In the life of Adm Zakharov, service in the Pacific was probably the most noteworthy event. At that time, I, as the chief of the political section of one of the formations of the Pacific Fleet and later the deputy chief of the political directorate of that fleet, knew Semen Yegorovich closely. He had an open and simple character, as well as enviable capacity for work and energy. We, the younger political workers, although gaining a good deal of experience during the war years, still willingly learned from him the capacity to work with others. He, in turn, always met us half way, he never refused either good advice or concrete aid and generously shared that knowledge which he had

gained during service. Semen Yegorovich had one other very good quality. He constantly showed and does show concern for others.

At present, S. Ye. Zakharov, it is a pleasure to say, is taking his well-earned rest. However, as before he is energetic and active in social work: he is a member of the editorial board of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, a member of the Presidium of the Soviet War Veterans Committee, and the vice president of the USSR--Australia and USSR--North Korea Friendship Societies. Being a candidate of historical sciences, S. Ye. Zakharov systematically appears in print, and has a number of works devoted to the history of the Navy, the Komsomol and party political work in the Soviet Army and Navy. For accomplishments in propagandizing political and scientific knowledge and in the communist indoctrination of the workers he was awarded the Medal imeni Academician S. I. Vavilov by the All-Union Znaniye [Knowledge] Society. Semen Yegorovich, when traveling abroad, often carries out social assignments for the Soviet War Veterans Committee.

Over all this service in the USSR Armed Forces, Semen Yegorovich Zakharov has taken an active part in political and social life. He was elected a deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet 2d, 3d and 4th sittings. At the 18th Party Congress, he was elected a member of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and at the 19th, a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee. It is noteworthy that his 80th anniversary coincides with the 60th anniversary of his membership in the Communist Party. For services to the motherland, Adm Zakharov has received the Orders of Lenin, October Revolution, the Red Banner, Ushakov 1st Degree, Patriotic War 1st Degree, three Orders of the Red Star, the Order "Honor Badge" and many medals. He is an honorary citizen of the town of Zaraysk in Moscow Oblast.

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Sept. 24, 1986